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Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality
Abstract

In 1996, in Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin – Michelin & Cie v National Automobile,
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) [Michelin], Justice
Teitelbaum of the Federal Court (Trial Division) held both that specific provisions of the Copyright Act did
not infringe the right to freedom of expression as protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and that, even if they did, these provisions could be justified under s 1 of the Charter. Since
Michelin, these conclusions have been treated by Canadian courts as settled. The purpose of this paper is to
challenge these conclusions by subjecting certain core provisions of the Copyright Act to Charter scrutiny. I
will do so in reliance on one case study, namely copyright term extension. I will argue that the use of
copyrighted works in the context of this case study constitutes protectable expression, and that core
provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression in purpose and
effect. As well, I will argue—drawing in particular from the SCC’s decision in Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Commission) v Whatcott—that these provisions might not be justified under s 1. Lastly, I will address the
remedies that might be granted by a court should it conclude that provisions of the Copyright Act
unjustifiably infringe s 2(b) of the Charter. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that there are serious questions to be
answered with respect to whether provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter
right to freedom of expression. It is time for Canadian courts to move past Michelin and to reconsider
copyright’s constitutionality.
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Reconsidering Copyright’s
Constitutionality
GRAHAM J. REYNOLDS*
In 1996, in Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin – Michelin & Cie v National
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada)
[Michelin], Justice Teitelbaum of the Federal Court (Trial Division) held both that specific
provisions of the Copyright Act did not infringe the right to freedom of expression as
protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that, even if they did, these
provisions could be justified under s 1 of the Charter. Since Michelin, these conclusions have
been treated by Canadian courts as settled. The purpose of this paper is to challenge these
conclusions by subjecting certain core provisions of the Copyright Act to Charter scrutiny. I will
do so in reliance on one case study, namely copyright term extension. I will argue that the
use of copyrighted works in the context of this case study constitutes protectable expression,
and that core provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act infringe the Charter right to freedom of
expression in purpose and effect. As well, I will argue—drawing in particular from the SCC’s
decision in Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott—that these provisions might
not be justified under s 1. Lastly, I will address the remedies that might be granted by a
court should it conclude that provisions of the Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe s 2(b) of
the Charter. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that there are serious questions to be answered
with respect to whether provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter
right to freedom of expression. It is time for Canadian courts to move past Michelin and to
reconsider copyright’s constitutionality.
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En 1996, dans l’affaire Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin c. le Syndicat national de
l’automobile, de l’aérospatiale, du transport et des autres travailleurs et travailleuses du Canada
- (TCA-Canada) [Michelin], le juge Teitelbaum de la section de première instance de la Cour
fédérale a statué que certaines dispositions de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur ne contreviennent
pas au droit de liberté d’expression tel que le définit la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés
et que, même si c’était le cas, ces dispositions pourraient être justifiées en vertu de l’article
premier de la Charte. Depuis le jugement Michelin, les tribunaux canadiens considèrent
résolues ces conclusions. Cet article a pour but de les remettre en question en soumettant
certaines dispositions fondamentales de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur à un examen détaillé à
la lumière de la Charte. Afin d’y parvenir, j’analyserai dans une étude de cas l’acception du
terme « droit d’auteur ». Je prétends dans cette étude de cas que l’utilisation de matériel
assujetti au droit d’auteur est protégée et que des dispositions fondamentales de la Loi sur le
droit d’auteur contreviennent en intention et en fait au droit de liberté d’expression tel que le
définit la Charte. Je prétends de plus, m’appuyant en particulier sur le jugement de la Cour
suprême du Canada dans l’affaire Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) c. Whatcott, que
de telles dispositions ne sont peut-être pas justifiées en vertu de l’article premier. J’aborderai
enfin les recours que pourrait accorder un tribunal s’il venait à conclure que les dispositions
de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur contreviennent à l’article 2b) de la Charte. Pour conclure, je
démontrerai que de sérieuses questions se posent quant à savoir si des dispositions de la
Loi sur le droit d’auteur contreviennent de manière injustifiée au droit de liberté d’expression
tel que le définit la Charte. Il serait grand temps que les tribunaux canadiens se dégagent du
jugement Michelin et remettent en question la constitutionnalité du droit d’auteur.
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DO PROVISIONS OF CANADA’S Copyright Act1 unjustifiably infringe the right to

freedom of expression as protected under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms?2 This question, while it has not been explicitly addressed by
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), has been addressed by a number of lower
Canadian courts.3 In the leading Canadian case to have addressed the intersection
of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright—Michelin4—Justice
Teitelbaum, of the Federal Court (Trial Division), held that specific provisions
of the Copyright Act did not infringe the Charter-protected right to freedom of
expression and, even if they did, they would be justified through the application
of a section 1 analysis. Since Michelin, these conclusions have been treated by
Canadian courts as settled.5
In this article, I argue that these conclusions ought not to be treated by
courts as settled and that based on current copyright and Charter jurisprudence,
a Canadian court could determine that provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act
unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. In so doing, this
article adds to the voices of those who have argued that Canadian courts should
reconsider the relationship between copyright and the Charter right to freedom

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Copyright Act RSC 1985, c C-42.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
See, for instance, Queen v James Lorimer & Co, [1982] FCJ No 229 FCTD & Queen v James
Lorimer & Co, [1984] 1 FC 1065, 777 CPR (2d) 262 [James Lorimer]; Canadian Tire Corp v
Retail Clerks Union, Local 1518, 7 CPR (3d) 415, [1985] FCJ No 1005; Rôtisseries St.-Hubert
Ltée v Le Syndicat des Travailleurs(euses) de la Rôtisserie St.-Hubert de Drummondville (C.S.N.),
[1987] RJQ 443, 17 CPR (3d) 461; Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin –
Michelin & Cie v CAW-Canada, [1996] FCJ No 1685, [1997] 2 FC 306 [Michelin]; Fraser
Health Authority v Hospital Employees’ Union, 2003 BCSC 807, 226 DLR (4th) 563;
Corporation Sun Média c Syndicat canadien de la function publique, 2007 QCCS 2943, DTE
2007T-630; Canwest Mediaworks Publications Inc v Horizon Publications Ltd, 2008 BCSC
1609, 173 ACWS (3d) 431 [Canwest 2008]; Drolet v Stiftung Gralsbotschaft (FC), 2009 FC
17, [2010] 1 FCR 492 [Drolet].
Michelin, ibid.
See, for example, Canwest 2008, supra note 3; Drolet, supra note 3. This attitude towards the
Copyright Act is the case despite the SCC’s articulation of the purpose of copyright having
evolved since Michelin. The evolution of the purpose of copyright in Canada is discussed in
greater depth in section 2(d) of this article. For other works that address this topic, see, for
instance, Daniel J Gervais, “The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada” (2005) 2 UOLTJ
315. In a separate work, I argue that the approach adopted in Michelin to the intersection of
the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright relies on now-invalid approaches to
both copyright and freedom of expression and, as a result, that this approach is itself invalid
and must be reconsidered.
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of expression, including David Fewer, Jane Bailey, Carys Craig, and Bita Amani.6
I also build upon my previous work in this area.7
6.

7.

David Fewer, “Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of
Copyright in Canada” (1997) 55:2 U Toronto Fac L Rev 175; Jane Bailey, “Deflating the
Michelin Man” in Michael Geist (ed), In the Public Interest (Irwin Law 2005); Carys J Craig,
“Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom
of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56:1 Univ of Toronto LJ 75; Bita Amani, “Copyright
and Freedom of Expression: Fair Dealing Between Work and Play” in Rosemary J Coombe,
Darren Wershler & Martin Zellinger (eds), Dynamic Fair Dealing: Creating Canadian Culture
Online (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).
Graham Reynolds, “A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Impact of the Legislative Protection
of Technological Protection Measures on Fair Dealing and Freedom of Expression” (2006)
5:3 CJLT 179; Graham Reynolds, “The Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Towards Explicit
Engagement, by the Supreme Court of Canada, with the Charter Right to Freedom of
Expression in the Context of Copyright” (2016) 41:2 Queen’s LJ 455. For other works that
address the intersection of freedom of expression and copyright in Canada, see Joe Conforti,
“Copyright and Freedom of Expression: A Privilege for New[s] Reports” (1990) 5 IPJ
130; Ysolde Gendreau, “Canadian Copyright Law and its Charters” in Jonathan Griffiths
and Uma Suthersanen (eds), Copyright and Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005) 245; Ysolde Gendreau, “Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Canada” in Paul
Torremans (ed), Copyright and Human Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004)
21; Alex Colangelo and Alana Maurushat, “Exploring the Limits of Computer Code as a
Protected Form of Expression: A Suggested Approach to Encryption, Computer Viruses, and
Technological Protection Measures” (2006) 51:1 McGill LJ 47; Sarah Sklar-Heyn, “Battling
Clearance Culture Shock: Comparing US Fair Use and Canadian Fair Dealing in Advancing
Freedom of Expression in Non-Fiction Film” (2011) 20:1 Cardozo J Int’l and Comp L 233;
Margaret Ann Wilkinson and Charles A. Painter, “Shifting the Balance of Copyright Control
for Photographic Works in Canada” (1998-1999) 13 IPJ 353; Teresa Scassa, “Intellectual
Property on the Cyber-Picket Line: A Comment on British Columbia Automobile Assn v
Office and Professional Employees’ International Union, Local 378” (2002) 39:4 Alta L Rev
934; Ian Kerr, Alana Maurushat and Christian Tacit, “Techical Protection Measures: Tilting
at Copyright’s Windmill” (2002/2003) 34:1 Ottawa L Rev 6; Ian Kerr and Jane Bailey,
“The Implications of Digital Rights Management for Privacy and Freedom of Expression”
(2004) 2:2 J of Info, Comm & Ethics in Soc 87; Abraham Drassinower, “A Rights-Based
View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law” (2003) 16:1 Can JL & Juris 3;
Myra J Tawfik, “International Copyright Law: W[h]ither User Rights?” in Michael Geist
(ed), In the Public Interest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 66; Gregory R Hagen and Nyall
Engfield, “Canadian Copyright Reform: P2P Sharing, Making Available and the Three-Step
Test” (2006) 3:2 UOLTJ 477; EAC Mohammed, “Parody as Fair Dealing in Canada:
A Guide for Lawyers and Judges” (2009) 4:7 JIPLP 468; Graham Reynolds, “A Stroke
of Genius or Copyright Infringement? Mashups and Copyright in Canada” (2009) 6:3
SCRIPTed 639; Graham Reynolds, “Towards a Right to Engage in the Fair Transformative
Use of Copyright-Protected Expression” in Michael Geist (ed), From Radical Extremism to
Balanced Copyright (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 395; Graham Reynolds, “All the Game’s a
Stage: Machinima and Copyright in Canada” (2010) 13:6 JWIP 729; Graham Reynolds,
“Necessarily Critical? The Adoption of a Parody Defence to Copyright Infringement in
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The article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I rely upon a hypothetical case of
copyright term extension to discuss the scope of the section 2(b) right to freedom
of expression in the context of copyright.8 I argue that the SCC’s freedom of
expression jurisprudence suggests that the unauthorized act at the heart of
the case considered in this article conveys or attempts to convey meaning and
thus constitutes protectable expression under section 2(b); that this act should
not be excluded from the scope of the Charter right to freedom of expression
due to the method or location of expression; and that key provisions of the
Copyright Act—namely the general infringement provision (section 27(1)), read
in context with the provisions granting rights in works (sections 3 and 5), the
primary remedy provisions (sections 34, 38.1 and 42), the provisions detailing
defences and limitations to copyright infringement (sections 29-30.9), and the
provision setting out the term of copyright in works (as amended) (section 6),
limit or restrict freedom of expression in purpose and effect, thus infringing the
Charter guarantee.9
In Part III, I draw upon SCC jurisprudence and related commentary
to discuss how the section 1 analysis might be applied in the context of the
hypothetical case considered in this article. I argue that this jurisprudence suggests

8.

9.

Canada” (2010) 33:2 Man LJ 241; Graham Reynolds, “The Impact of Canadian Copyright
Laws on the Voices of Marginalised Groups: Towards a Right to Rewrite” (2010-2011) 48:1
Alta L Rev 35; Teresa Scassa, “Trademarks Worth a Thousand Words: Freedom of Expression
and the Use of the Trademarks of Others” (2012) 53:4 Les Cahiers de droit 887; Katie Sykes,
“Towards a Public Justification of Copyright” (2003) 61:1 UT Fac L Rev 1; Daniel Gervais,
“Making Copyright Whole” (2008) 5:1 UOLTJ 1; David Vaver, “Intellectual Property: The
State of the Art” (2000) 116:4 LQR 621; David Vaver, “Copyright Defences as User Rights”
(2012-2013) 60:4 J Copyright Soc’y USA 661; Pascale Chapdelaine, “The Ambiguous
Nature of Copyright Users’ Rights” (2013) 26:1 IPJ 1 at 18; Sunny Handa, Copyright Law in
Canada (Markham, Ont: Butterworths, 2002) at 95; David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2000) at 22; David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd Ed (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2011) at 46-50. See also Graham Reynolds and others, Canadian Intellectual Property
Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013). One section of this casebook addresses the
intersection of freedom of expression and copyright (see pp 173-77). See, as well, Rebecca
Tushnet, “Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common
with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications
Regulation” (2000) 42:1 BC L Rev 1 for a similar analysis in the US context.
Like its articulation of the purpose of copyright, the SCC’s view of the correct scope of s 2(b)
has also changed over time. For a work that describes, in detail, the evolution of the SCC’s
articulation of the scope of s 2(b), see Jamie Cameron, “The Past, Present, and Future of
Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.
Copyright Act, supra note 1. Bailey, as well, has argued that “[a] strong argument can be made
that the [Copyright] Act’s prohibition against expressing certain content constitutes a prima
facie section 2(b) violation.” See Bailey, supra note 6 at 144.
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that the objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act is pressing and
substantial and that there is a rational connection between this objective and the
impugned provisions. However, I argue further that the impugned provisions may
be considered overbroad and as a result may fail the minimal impairment branch
of the proportionality test. In addition, a court could find that the deleterious
impact of the provisions may not be outweighed by their benefits. As a result,
these provisions may not be justified under a section 1 analysis.
Part IV addresses remedies. In the event that the impugned provisions noted
above are held to infringe the section 2(b) right to freedom of expression and
are not saved by section 1, what might be the appropriate remedy? While a
court could sever part of the offending provision (or provisions), my analysis of
section 1 jurisprudence suggests that a court could find that the most appropriate
remedy would be for the Court to declare the Copyright Act, in its entirety,
to be of no force or effect (albeit with a temporary suspension of invalidity).
Although appearing at first glance to be a radical outcome, such an action would
be consistent with both past Charter jurisprudence and, more generally, with the
division of authority between courts and Parliament.
My purpose in writing this article is to call into question the view that
arguments challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Copyright Act
on Charter right to freedom of expression grounds are “bound to fail,” as one
lower court stated.10 Rather, given that a Canadian court could determine
that provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter
right to freedom of expression, it is important for Canadian courts to consider
the question of copyright’s constitutionality rather than reject it out of hand.
As Margaret Radin writes, “[i]t may be that the copyright law that we have can
easily meet the freedom of expression test, but that does not mean that we should
not apply the test to see whether the law meets it.”11

10. Canwest 2008, supra note 3 at para 37.
11. Margaret Jane Radin, “The Rule of Law in the Information Age: Reconciling Private Rights
and Public Values” (2009) 4 JL Phil & Culture 83 at 104. It should be noted that Radin is
speaking in the context of US copyright law.
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I. COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (SECTION 2(B))
A. HYPOTHETICAL CASE: COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION

Justice L’Heureux-Dubé noted in Dunmore, that “Charter litigation
decisions cannot be made in a factual vacuum.”12 The question of copyright’s
constitutionality must be addressed in the context of a specific factual matrix.
The hypothetical case that I rely on for the purposes of this article is as follows:
An action is brought against A for copyright infringement for making available
works the copyright in which would have expired were it not for a legislative
amendment to the Copyright Act, enacted after the works were created, that
extended the term of copyright for both future and existing works. The case
assumes that the act complained of prima facie infringes copyright and is not
saved by any defence to copyright infringement. The defendant, A, argues that
specific provisions of the Copyright Act (both the provision setting out the term
of protection for copyrighted works as well as other core provisions) unjustifiably
infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression.13
I have selected this hypothetical because a recent amendment to the Copyright
14
Act, as well as possible future amendments to the Copyright Act,15 suggest that
in the not too distant future, a case challenging the constitutionality of similar
provisions of the Copyright Act could be brought. However, I do not mean to
suggest that this is the only type of situation that might lead a court to determine
12. Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94 at para 126, [2001] 3 SCR
1016 [Dunmore].
13. As a preliminary issue, it should be noted that the SCC has held that statutory provisions are
not presumed to be consistent with the Charter. As noted by Justice Beetz, who delivered the
judgment of the Court, “the innovative and evolutive character of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms conflicts with the idea that a legislative provision can be presumed to
be consistent with the Charter.” See Manitoba (Attorney General) v Metropolitan Stores (MTS)
Ltd, [1987] 1 SCR 110 at 112, 38 DLR (4th) 321.
14. As part of a budget implementation act that received royal assent on June 23, 2015, the
Government of Canada extended the term of copyright protection in published sound
recordings (both existing and not-yet-created) from, broadly speaking, fifty years after
publication to seventy years after publication. Both existing works and works not-yet-created
receive the benefit of this extension. See Copyright Act, supra note 1 at ss 23(1)(b), 23(1.1).
15. On February 4, 2016, Canada signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, one
of the articles of which requires contracting parties to protect works, performances,
and phonograms for the term of the natural life of the author plus 70 years after the
author’s death. See Trans-Pacific Partnership (Final Draft), 4 February 2016, USTR
2010 00014 at art 18.63, online: <ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text>.
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that provisions of the Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to
freedom of expression, or that my conclusions are restricted to the specific case
presented. Rather, I present this case as an illustrative example of some of the
constitutional issues raised by Canadian copyright law.16
B. DO THE ACTIVITIES IN QUESTION HAVE EXPRESSIVE CONTENT?

As noted by Justice Cory in Libman v Quebec (Attorney General), the SCC has
interpreted the Charter right to freedom of expression broadly in order to “extend
the guarantee under the Canadian Charter to as many expressive activities as
possible.”17 According to Justice Cory, “any activity or communication that
conveys or attempts to convey meaning is covered by the guarantee of section
2(b) of the Canadian Charter,” aside from certain circumstances in which the
method or location of an expression will result in the expression not being
protected under the Charter right to freedom of expression (an issue that will be
addressed in the next section).18
In making a copyrighted work available, is A conveying or attempting to
convey meaning? One factor that must be addressed in considering this question
is whether section 2(b), despite protecting an “infinite variety of forms of
expression,” only protects expression made by the individual claiming the benefit

16. Furthermore, I have intentionally not included additional details in this case study, such as
a specific work or individual, in order to avoid drawing attention away from the broader
question of whether a Canadian court could determine that provisions of Canada’s Copyright
Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. For works the focus
of which is copyright term extension, see, for instance, Marci A Hamilton, “Copyright
Duration Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright” (1996) 14:3 Cardozo Arts & Ent
L J 655; Arthur R Miller, “Copyright Term Extension: Boon for American Creators and
the American Economy” (1998) 45:3 J Copyright Soc’y USA 319; Tyler T Ochoa, “Patent
and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective” (2001)
49:1 J Copyright Soc’y USA 19; Dennis S Karjala, “Judicial Review of Copyright Term
Extension Legislation” (2002) 36:1 Loy LA L Rev 199; Richard A Epstein, “The Dubious
Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act” (2002) 36:1 Loy LA L Rev 123;
Marvin Ammori, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension” (2002) 16:1 Harv J L &
Tech 287; Martin Kretschmer et al, “Creatvity Stifled? A Joint Academic Statement on the
Proposed Copyright Term Extension for Sound Recordings” (2008) 30:9 EIPR 341.
17. Libman v Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 SCR 569 at para 31, 151 DLR (4th) 385.
18. Ibid.
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of the section 2(b) right.19 The question of whether a party can convey meaning,
for section 2(b) purposes, using the copyright-protected expression of another
was answered in the affirmative in Michelin. Justice Teitelbaum concluded that,
despite the fact that “‘Bibendum’ [the “Michelin Man” character] is not the fruits
of the defendants’ own labours,” the Canadian Auto-Workers Union (CAW)
was conveying meaning, and thus engaging in expression, by using the modified
Bibendum on its pamphlets and leaflets.20 As he noted, “[a]t its minimum, the
meaning in this instance is that Michelin workers should band together in the
union before they are stomped into submission by the corporate powers symbolized
by the ‘Bibendum.’”21 Carys Craig echoes Justice Teitelbaum’s conclusion that
CAW’s use of Bibendum conveys meaning, writing that “the defendants’ depiction
of Bibendum contributed something to the public understanding, generating
new meaning by recontextualizing a powerful communicative symbol, expressing
it anew and with a radically different message.”22
Some might argue, however, that rather than conveying or attempting to
convey meaning, all that A is doing in my hypothetical case is engaging in a
purely physical act, unconnected to expression. Indeed, some courts have
interpreted as purely physical acts that might otherwise be seen as expressive.23
The result of this interpretation is that the act is not considered to be protectable
expression under the Charter right to freedom of expression. One instance in
which this classification occurred was in R v Ludacka,24 a case heard by the Court
of Appeal for Ontario (OCA). Ludacka dealt with the question of whether a
series of explicit sex acts, performed on stage, constituted expression and, thus,

19. Weisfeld v Canada (CA), [1994] FCJ No 999 at para 29, 116 DLR (4th) 232. See also Craig,
supra note 6 at 83-84. Here he argues that “[t]hat the expression originates with the speaker
is simply not a requirement of an attempt to convey meaning before it can fall within the
freedom-of-expression guarantee… If someone writes ‘War is Terrorism!’ on a placard
and hands it to me, I would be expressing myself by waving that placard. The expression
may not be mine in the copyright sense of having originated from me as an author, but by
demonstrating my support of that message, I would undoubtedly be engaged in an act of
self-expression.”
20. Michelin, supra note 3 at 40. See also Coles Book Stores Ltd v Ontario (Attorney General)
(1991), 6 OR (3d) 673 at para 80, 88 DLR (4th) 312.
21. Michelin, ibid at 41.
22. Craig, supra note 6 at 112.
23. See, for instance, Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 969,
58 DLR (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy]. Specifically, see where Chief Justice Dickson and Justices
Lamer and Wilson write that “[i]t might be difficult to characterize certain day-to-day tasks,
like parking a car, as having expressive content.”
24. (1996), 105 CCC (3d) 565, 28 OR (2d) 19 [Ludacka].

907

(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

was prima facie protected by the Charter.25 Justice Dubin held that the explicit
sexual acts complained of were “purely physical activity which does not convey
or attempt to convey meaning.”26 Applying this decision in the context of A’s
actions, it could be argued that the act of making available copyrighted works
is a purely physical activity that does not convey or attempt to convey meaning.
The approach adopted in Ludacka, however, can be critiqued on several
grounds. First, it is inconsistent with the expansive conception of section 2(b)
repeatedly affirmed by Canadian courts. In Ontario Adult Entertainment Bar Assn
v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality),27 a case decided after Ludacka, the OCA
held that explicit lap dancing is expression, as “courts have taken an expansive
view in approaching the characterization of conduct as expression.” Further,
“competing values and interests that arise when viewing certain impugned
conduct” that might otherwise lead a court to determine that conduct does not
constitute expression, are more properly assessed under a section 1 analysis.28
Second, the decision in Ludacka can also be critiqued on the basis that it is
inconsistent with prior SCC jurisprudence. In Butler (which was decided by the
SCC four years before the OCA’s decision was handed down in Ludacka), Justice
Sopinka stated that “I cannot agree with the premise that purely physical activity,
such as sexual activity, cannot be expression.”29 Justice Sopinka distinguished
“purely physical activity” (that is, physical activity that is not intended to convey a
meaning, and does not convey a meaning) from the sale and rental of “‘hard core’
videotapes and magazines as well as sexual paraphernalia.”30 He held that “while
indeed ‘physical’”, the sale and rental of these items “conveys ideas, opinions,
or feelings.”31 Despite involving an element of physicality—in that individuals
must engage in some physical act or process in order to make a work available
for others to access—Butler and Ontario Adult Entertainment suggest that the
act of so doing is a physical act that conveys information, expression, ideas, and
opinions, and thus should be seen as expressive.

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid at 572.
27. Ontario Adult Entertainment Bar Assn v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (1995),
35 OR (3d) 161, 151 DLR (4th) 158 [Ontario Adult Entertainment].
28. Ibid at para 50.
29. R v Butler, [1992] 1 SCR 452 at 489, 89 DLR (4th) 449 [Butler]. As Justices Dickson,
Lamer, Wilson held in Irwin Toy, even the act of parking a car can have expressive content.
See Irwin Toy, supra note 23 at 969.
30. Butler, ibid at 461.
31. Ibid at para 487.
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C. IS THE ACTIVITY EXCLUDED FROM THAT PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF
EITHER THE LOCATION OR THE METHOD OF EXPRESSION

Notwithstanding the SCC’s characterization of the Charter right to freedom of
expression as a broad and expansive right, some acts that convey or attempt to
convey meaning are excluded from the scope of protectable expression on the
basis of either the method or the location of the expression. In their majority
reasons in Montréal (City),32 Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Deschamps
wrote that these exclusions should not be interpreted broadly. Instead, “expressive
activity should be excluded from the protective scope of s. 2(b) only if its method
or location clearly undermines the values that underlie the guarantee,” namely
self-fulfillment, democratic discourse, and truth-finding.33
1.

METHOD OF EXPRESSION

The sole method of expression to have been excluded from protection by the SCC
under section 2(b), subsequent to Irwin Toy, is violent expression or expression
that takes the form of violence. In Montréal (City), Justices McLachlin and
Deschamps noted that although it “may be a means of political expression and
may serve to enhance the self-fulfillment of the perpetrator,” violent expression
is excluded from protection under section 2(b) on the basis that it “prevents
dialogue rather than fostering it,” “prevents the self-fulfillment of the victim
rather than enhancing it,” and “stands in the way of finding the truth rather than
furthering it.”34
Some might describe the unauthorized use of copyrighted works as a violent
act, as an act that harms the author of the work, or as an act that is equivalent to a
violent act.35 The scope of the violence exclusion from section 2(b), however, has
been confined by Canadian courts to acts of violence committed by one individual
against another, or to threats of violence.36 While it is possible that in certain
instances, individuals could engage in the unauthorized use of copyright-protected
32.
33.
34.
35.

Montréal (City) v 2952-1366 Québec Inc, 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 SCR 141 [Montréal].
Ibid at para 72.
Ibid.
For instance, in an article published in the Guardian Newspaper, Alexis Petridis describes
how the singer Madonna characterized the unauthorized leak of music from her album
Rebel Heart as “a form of terrorism” and “artistic rape.” See Alexis Petridis, “Madonna: I did
not say, ‘Hey, here’s my music, and it’s finished.’ It was theft” The Guardian (December 21,
2014), online: <http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/dec/21/madonna-album-hackliving-state-terror> .
36. See, for instance, Irwin Toy, supra note 23; R v Geoghegan, 2004 ABPC 127,
[2004] AWLD 610.

909

(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

expression in a manner that threatens violence against an individual (for instance
combining clips of movies and sending them to an individual as part of a threat
of violence against that individual or against a group with which the individual
identifies), in most circumstances, excluding uses of copyrighted works from the
protection of section 2(b) of the Charter on the basis that unauthorized use of
copyrighted works harms the author of the work (or is equivalent to a violent
act or a threat of violence) would be to adopt an interpretation of violence
inconsistent with the way in which violence has been interpreted by Canadian
courts in the context of this step of the section 2(b) analysis.
Violence aside, are there any other ways in which A’s action could be
considered to “undermine[] the values underlying s 2(b)” on the basis of the
method of expression, and be excluded from the scope of protectable expression
on this basis?37 A’s making available works that, but for a retroactively-applied
legislative amendment to the Copyright Act extending the term of copyright,
would be in the public domain could prevent dialogue. For instance, it could lead
authors to choose not to write additional works out of concern that those works
would be disseminated without their authorization. Furthermore, to the extent
that the self-fulfilment (or “self-actualization”38) of the original authors in my
hypothetical case is linked to their ability to control or manage the dissemination
of their copyrighted works, their self-fulfilment may be limited by the widespread
dissemination of their copyrighted works by A. Finally, the unauthorized use
of copyrighted works by A may “stand[] in the way of finding the truth” if it
causes authors who might otherwise contribute to the truth-finding process not
to write, or leads publishers who might disseminate works that would otherwise
contribute to the truth-finding process not to publish.39
Canadian courts have held, however, that in situations where the method
of expression cannot be separated from its content, the expression is entitled
to protection under section 2(b) regardless of whether that method might
“undermine[] the values underlying s. 2(b).”40 In my hypothetical case, the method
through which the message is conveyed—when the content of the expression is
stripped from the equation—does not conflict with the values underlying freedom
of expression. Making copyrighted works available does not, in and of itself,
undermine or conflict with those values. Rather, the argument that this method
37.
38.
39.
40.

Montréal, supra note 32 at para 72.
R v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2 at para 76, [2001] 1 SCR 45 [Sharpe].
Montréal, supra note 32 at para 72.
Ibid. See, for instance, Canadian Broadcasting Corp v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 2
at para. 3, 52-53, [2011] 1 SCR 19 [CBC].

Reynolds, Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality 910

of expression undermines the values that underpin freedom of expression “rests
on its content”—namely the fact that the works made available are works that are
copyrighted.41 As a result, this argument, as was held by Justices McLachlin and
Deschamps in Montréal (City), “cannot be considered in addressing the issue of
whether the method … of the expression itself is inimical to s. 2(b).”42
The argument that the method of expression in my hypothetical case cannot
be separated from its content, and thus the expression should not be excluded
from the scope of protectable expression, is supported by SCC jurisprudence
relating to choice of language and artistic expression. Both of these types of
expression have been said by the SCC to be instances in which the method or
form of expression is inseparable from its content. In Reference re: s. 193 and
195.1(1)(C) of the Criminal Code, for instance, Justice Lamer wrote that:
In my view the choice of the language through which one communicates is central
to one’s freedom of expression. The choice of language is more than a utilitarian
decision; language is, indeed, an expression of one’s culture and often of one’s sense
of dignity and self-worth. Language is, shortly put, both content and form.43

Art is another type of expression in which form and content are linked.
Justice Lamer, in Reference re: s. 193, wrote that “just as language colours the
content of writing or speech, artistic forms colour and indeed help to define the
product of artistic expression.”44 He went on to state that:
Without settling the matter conclusively, I am of the view that at the very least a
law that makes it an offence to convey a meaning or message, however distasteful
or unpopular, through a traditional form of expression like the written or spoken
word or art must be viewed as a restriction on freedom of expression, and must be
justified, if possible, by s. 1 of the Charter.45

Like language and art, the choice to express oneself using copyrighted
content can be seen as “an expression of cultural identity, and in many cases is
an expression of one’s identity.”46 For instance, using a copyrighted image on
41. Montréal, supra note 32 at para 68.
42. Ibid at para 68.
43. Reference re ss 193 & 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 SCR 1123 at 1181, 56 CCC
(3d) 65 [Reference re: s. 193]. See also Ford v Quebec, [1988] 2 SCR 712 at para. 40, 54 DLR
(4th) 577. In the latter, the Court wrote that: “[l]anguage is so intimately related to the form
and content of expression that there cannot be true freedom … of expression by means of
language if one is prohibited from using the language of one’s choice. Language is not merely
a means or medium of expression; it colours the content and meaning of expression.”
44. Ibid, Reference re: 193 at 1182.
45. Ibid at 1184.
46. Ibid at 1182.
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a personal web page, wearing a t-shirt with a logo of a product or company
a person identifies with or supports, creating a mix tape or CD or playlist,
combining two existing works into one new work, and sending a friend a link
to a song are some of the myriad acts that can be seen as instances of individuals
expressing their identity through the use of copyrighted works. In addition,
again like language and art, the use of copyrighted content “colours the content
and meaning of expression.”47 A different message is conveyed by the use of
Bibendum in the pamphlets prepared by the CAW than by a description of the
business practices engaged in by Michelin that the CAW finds objectionable. The
use of copyrighted content, therefore, is “both content and form.”48 As Craig
writes, “[t]he question of whether a work as a whole is subject to copyright and,
if so, what elements of the work fall within the scope of the owner’s interest
cannot be divorced from an inquiry into the nature and content of the expressive
work.”49 As was held in CBC 2011, the method of expression—namely the use
of copyrighted content—“cannot be considered separately from the content and
cannot serve as a basis for excluding the expressive activity from the protection of
s. 2(b) of the Charter.”50
Furthermore, although different from the laws at issue in Reference re: s. 193,
in which the SCC considered the constitutionality of certain provisions relating
to prostitution (including the section of the Criminal Code that prohibited
communications in public for the purpose of prostitution), copyright can be
conceptualized as “a law that makes it an offence to convey a meaning or message
… through a traditional form of expression like the written or spoken word or
art.”51 Instead of prohibiting specific messages, or types of communications, the
provisions of the Copyright Act prohibit the manner in which those messages are
expressed (namely through the use of copyrighted content).
Reference re: s. 193 and CBC 2011, taken together, suggest that the act
described in my hypothetical case should not be excluded from the scope of
protectable expression on the basis of the method of expression, and that the
provisions of the Copyright Act restraining this type of use should instead be seen
as a restriction on freedom of expression that requires justification through a
section 1 analysis.
2.

LOCATION OF EXPRESSION

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Ford v Quebec (Attorney General), supra note 43 at 748.
Reference re: 193, supra note 43 at 1181.
Craig, supra note 6 at 99.
CBC, supra note 40 at para 53.
Reference re: 193, supra note 42 at 1184.
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Justice Teitelbaum, in Michelin, took the view that expression that makes use of
copyrighted works should be excluded from protection under section 2(b) on
the basis that copyright-protected expression, a species of private property, could
not be used in the service of freedom of expression.52 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Teitelbaum drew parallels between the use of copyright-protected
expression (considered by the SCC to be property, as described below), and
expressing oneself on private property.53
In recent years, the SCC has clarified the test for excluding messages conveyed
on either private or public property from the scope of protectable expression
under section 2(b). As noted by Justice Deschamps in CBC 2011, “for … the
location of the conveyance of a message to be excluded from Charter protection,
the court must find that it conflicts with the values protected by s. 2(b), namely
self-fulfilment, democratic discourse and truth finding.”54
In Montréal (City), Justices McLachlin and Deschamps affirmed that
expression taking place on private property is generally not protected by
section 2(b). However, their judgment implies that the reason why expression
taking place on private property falls outside the protected sphere of section
2(b) is not because property rights exist outside of the scope of the Charter.
Rather, it is because of the way the Charter has been interpreted as applying to
government action.55 In instances in which private property rights do not involve
state-imposed limits on expression, the Charter would not apply as “state action
is necessary to implicate the Canadian Charter.”56 However, in situations where
private property is intertwined with state-imposed limits on expression, those
limits may be challenged using the Charter right to freedom of expression.57

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Michelin, supra note 3 at 39-49.
Bailey, supra note 6 at 143; Craig, supra note 6 at 92.
CBC, supra note 40 at para 37.
See RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 573, 33 DLR (4th) 174.
Montréal, supra note 32 at para 62.
See, for instance, R v Layton, [1986] OJ No 3069, 38 CCC (3d) 550. Jack Layton had
been convicted under s 2(1)(b) of the Trespass to Property Act, RSO 1980, c 511 for refusing
to leave the Eaton Centre (a shopping mall) after having been directed to leave by the
persons in charge of that private property. Layton had been handing out leaflets relating to a
unionization campaign. The Ontario Provincial Court found that Layton’s s 2(b) rights had
been unjustifiably infringed.
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The SCC, on multiple occasions, has referred to copyright as a species of
property.58 If copyrights are to be considered property rights, however, they do
not exist independently of the Copyright Act. Rather, they are rights created by
the state through the passage of copyright legislation. As Justice Estey wrote in
Compo Co v Blue Crest Music Inc:
copyright law … is statutory law. It neither cuts across existing rights in property or
conduct nor falls between rights and obligations heretofore existing in the common
law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and obligations upon the terms and
in the circumstances set out in the statute.59

Given both that copyright is a “creature of statute,” and that it limits the
expression of some in order to advance the interests of others (e.g., authors,
publishers, and the public more generally), the property rights granted under
the Copyright Act can be said to involve “state-imposed limits on expression.”60
They are thus subject to the Charter, and a Charter analysis must be conducted in
the same manner in the context of copyright as with other legislation. As Craig
writes, “[b]ecause copyright is an interest conferred by government regulation,
it follows that it can be subjected to Charter scrutiny and limited in the name
of the rights enshrined in the Charter.”61 Contrary to the conclusion reached by
Justice Teitelbaum in Michelin, the formal conception of copyright as a private
property right should not result in the exclusion of expression that makes use of
the copyrighted works of others from the scope of section 2(b) of the Charter on
the basis of the location of expression.62

58. In Cinar Corporation v Robinson, Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the Court,
characterized the infringement of copyright as “a breach of … property rights.” She also
stated that “[c]opyright infringement is a violation of s. 6 of the [Quebec] Charter, which
provides that ‘[e]very person has a right to the peaceful enjoyment and free disposition
of his property, except to the extent provided by law.’” See Cinar Corporation v Robinson,
2013 SCC 73, at paras 102, 114, [2013] 3 SCR 1168 [Cinar]. As well, in Canadian
Artists’ Representation v National Gallery of Canada, copyright is referred to, in a number of
instances, as property. See Canadian Artists’ Representation v National Gallery of Canada, 2014
SCC 42 at paras 16 & 22, [2014] 2 SCR 197.
59. Compo Co Ltd v Blue Crest Music et al, [1980] 1 SCR 357 at 373, 105 DLR (3d) 249.
60. Montréal, supra note 32 at para 62.
61. Craig, supra note 6 at 95.
62. Bailey, as well, writes that “foreclosing the protection of certain expression under section
2(b) on the basis that it conflicts with unentrenched property rights directly contradicts the
concept of constitutional paramountcy – with the unenshrined property right seemingly
taking precedence over the enshrined right to free expression.” See Bailey, supra note 6 at 142.

Reynolds, Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality 914

D. “IF THE ACTIVITY IS PROTECTED, DOES AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE
PROTECTED RIGHT RESULT FROM EITHER THE PURPOSE OR THE
EFFECT OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTION?”63

Section 27(1) is the general infringement section under the Copyright Act.
It provides that “[i]t is an infringement of copyright for any person to do,
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only
the owner of the copyright has the right to do.”64 The rights of copyright owners
are set out in section 3 of the Copyright Act. These rights include the right to
reproduce a work, to perform a work in public, and to communicate the work to
the public by telecommunication, in whole or in substantial part.65
Section 5 of the Copyright Act sets out the conditions for subsistence
of copyright. Section 5(1) notes that provided certain citizenship/residence
requirements are met, “copyright shall subsist in Canada, for the term hereinafter
mentioned, in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work.”66 The
term of copyright is addressed in sections 6-12 of the Copyright Act. The general
term of copyright in Canada is the life of the author plus fifty years from the
end of the calendar year in which the author dies.67 The legislation outlined in
my hypothetical case extends the term of copyright protection in both existing
and future works.
Section 34(1) of the Copyright Act details the remedies that are available
to copyright owners. It states that “[w]here copyright has been infringed, the
owner of the copyright is, subject to this Act, entitled to all remedies by way
of injunction, damages, accounts, delivery up and otherwise that are or may
be conferred by law for the infringement of a right.”68 Statutory damages are
provided for in section 38.1 of the Copyright Act, and criminal remedies are
addressed in section 42.69 Defences to copyright infringement in Canada, the
most expansive of which is fair dealing, are set out in sections 29-30.9 of the
Copyright Act..70
Do the provisions of the Copyright Act, in purpose or effect, infringe section
2(b)? First, what is the purpose of the provisions in question? Justice Teitelbaum,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

CBC, supra note 40 at para 38.
Copyright Act, supra note 1 at s 27(1).
Ibid at s 3.
Ibid at s 5.
Ibid at s 6.
Ibid at s 34(1).
Ibid at ss 38.1, 42.
Ibid at ss 29-29.2, 29.21-30.9, 38.1, and 42.
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in Michelin, defined the objective of the Copyright Act as “[t]he protection of
authors and ensuring that they are recompensed for their creative energies and
works.”71 However, this view of the purpose of copyright—referred to by Justice
Abella as “author-centric”—represents the “former framework” for copyright.72
In its place, the SCC—beginning with Justice Binnie’s majority decision
in Théberge—has stated that there are two objectives to copyright, namely to
ensure that copyright owners receive a just or fair reward, and to advance the
public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts
and intellect.73
What is the relationship between these two objectives? Addressing this
question in detail is beyond the scope of this article. Given the importance to a
Charter analysis of properly characterizing the objective of impugned provisions,
however, a court faced with a challenge to copyright’s constitutionality will need
to grapple with this question.74 One way to frame this relationship would be to say
that one of the two purposes articulated by Justice Binnie in Théberge acts in the
service of the other. Under this view, the just rewards provided in the Copyright
Act are the means through which the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect is advanced. Support for this
articulation of copyright’s purpose can be found in Cinar, in which Chief Justice
McLachlin wrote that copyright “seeks to ensure that an author will reap the
benefits of his efforts, in order to incentivize the creation of new works.”75
I adopt this conception of copyright—in which the purpose of copyright
is to incentivize the creation of expression by granting copyright owners rights
in works of expression as well as the ability, through the state, to enforce
infringements of those rights—for the purposes of this article. Under a different

71. Michelin, supra note 3 at 53. Similarly, in Canadian Private Copying Collective v Canadian
Storage Media Alliance Justice Nöel, who delivered the reasons for judgment of the FCA,
wrote that “[t]he essential element of the federal legislative competence over copyright …
involves the establishment of a legal framework allowing rightsholders to be rewarded for
the reproduction of recorded music by third parties.” Canadian Private Copying Collective v
Canadian Storage Media Alliance, 2004 FCA 424 at para 33, 246 DLR (4th) 193 [CPCC].
72. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at
para 9, [2012] 2 SCR 326.
73. Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc, 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 SCR 336 [Théberge].
74. Craig, for instance, argues that “the failure [by Canadian courts] to satisfactorily consider
copyright in the light of freedom-of-expression values can be traced back to a broader failure
to appreciate the nature and the purpose of copyright.” See Craig, supra note 6 at 81.
75. Cinar, supra note 58 at para 23 [emphasis added].
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view of copyright’s purpose(s), however, both the section 2(b) analysis and the
section 1 analysis might proceed differently.76
In seeking to determine whether core provisions of the Copyright Act infringe
section 2(b) in purpose or effect, the example used in Irwin Toy of a rule against
handing out pamphlets is informative. As noted by Chief Justice Dickson and
Justices Lamer and Wilson (who co-wrote the majority reasons for judgment),
this rule—despite “purport[ing] to control litter”—“is ‘tied to content.’”77 That is
to say, “[t]he rule aims to control access by others to a meaning being conveyed as
well as to control the ability of the pamphleteer to convey a meaning.”78 Like the
rule at issue in Irwin Toy, the provisions of the Copyright Act noted above are also
“tied to content.”79 They “control access by others to a meaning being conveyed,”
namely the meaning of the copyrighted work, and any meanings that are added
to that work by parties that re-work it; they also “control the ability of [the
unauthorized user of copyrighted content] to convey a meaning.”80 In so doing,
the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act limit, deny, and abridge expression.
In addition to arguing that the purpose of the impugned provisions of the
Copyright Act is to limit or abridge expression, it can also be argued that their
effect is to deny or abridge freedom of expression. As noted by the majority in
Irwin Toy, in order to demonstrate that the effect of government action is to deny
or abridge freedom of expression, “a plaintiff must state her claim with reference
to the principles and values underlying the freedom,” namely truth-seeking,
participation in decision-making, and self-fulfillment and human flourishing.
In the context of my hypothetical case, the effect of the impugned provisions
is to deny or abridge freedom of expression. The application of the Copyright Act
restricts or limits A’s ability to disseminate expression. It also restricts the ability
of the public to receive expression from A. As a result, both A and the public are
prevented from using this expression to the degree that they otherwise might,
in the furtherance of truth-seeking, social and political decision-making, and
self-fulfillment.
Thus far in this article, I have argued that A’s making available of copyrighted
works constitutes expression, that it should not be removed from the scope of
76. For instance, the section 2(b) and section 1 analyses might proceed differently if the purpose
of copyright was to protect authors’ dignity interests, to reward authors for their labour,
or to maximize the creation of certain types of works.
77. Irwin Toy, supra note 23 at 974.
78. Ibid.
79. Bailey refers to Canada’s copyright laws as “classic content-based restriction[s].” See Bailey,
supra note 6 at 139.
80. Irwin Toy, supra note 23 at 974.
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protectable expression due to the method or location of expression, and that
certain core provisions of the Copyright Act infringe the section 2(b) guarantee
of freedom of expression in both purpose and effect. Unless they can be justified
under section 1 of the Charter, these provisions should be declared of no
force or effect.

II. SECTION 1 OF THE CHARTER, APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT
OF COPYRIGHT
A. ARE THE MEASURES PRESCRIBED BY LAW?

The first question to be addressed under a section 1 analysis is whether the
impugned provisions are “limits prescribed by law” within the meaning of
section 1.81 In R v Therens, Justice Le Dain (dissenting on other grounds) stated
that “[t]he limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if it is
expressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication
from the terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements.”82
The impugned measures that are the focus of this article are expressly provided
for in the Copyright Act. As a result, the provisions of the Copyright Act are limits
prescribed by law for the purposes of the section 1 analysis.
B. PRESSING AND SUBSTANTIAL OBJECTIVE?

The next part of the section 1 analysis asks whether the objective of the impugned
provisions is “sufficiently important to justify overriding a Charter freedom.”83
The SCC has noted that properly characterizing the objective of the impugned
provisions is of “great importance”84 to the section 1 analysis. Justice Deschamps
has written that “all steps of the Oakes test are premised on a proper identification
of the objective of the impugned measure.”85 Of particular concern is the need
to ensure that the objective is not articulated in an overbroad manner. As stated
by Chief Justice McLachlin in RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General),
“[i]f the objective is stated too broadly, its importance may be exaggerated and

81. Charter, supra note 2 at s 1.
82. R v Therens, [1985] 1 SCR 613 at 645, 18 DLR (4th) 655.
83. Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 SCR 989 at para 112,
176 DLR (4th) 513.
84. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Canada, 2010 SCC 21 at para 20, [2010] 1 SCR 721
[Toronto Star].
85. Ibid at para 20.
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the analysis compromised.”86 One possible negative consequence of overstating
the legislative objective is that it may be difficult to establish that the provision
(i.e., the “means adopted to promote” the objective)87 is minimally impairing.
What are the objectives of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act?
As noted above, for the purposes of this analysis, I adopt the view that the
objective of the impugned provisions is to incentivize the creation of expression
by granting copyright owners rights in works of expression, as well as the ability,
through the state, to remedy infringements of those rights.
The objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act is consistent
with this objective. That is to say, in order to incentivize the creation and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect, the Copyright Act grants,
to authors of works (section 5), a set of time-limited (sections 6-12) rights
(section 3) with respect to these works; permits authors to assign those rights to
others (section 13(4)); makes it an infringement of copyright to engage in any
of the acts that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to do without the
authorization of the copyright owner, provided no defences or limitations exist to
render the act non-infringing (sections 27, and 29-30.9); and makes available to
copyright owners a number of remedies in the event that their rights are infringed
(sections 34, 38.1 and 42).88
Is the objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act pressing
and substantial? In JTI, Chief Justice McLachlin (who delivered the judgment
for the Court), citing Peter Hogg’s Constitutional Law of Canada, noted that
“[a]n objective will be deemed proper if it is for the realization of collective goals
of fundamental importance.”89 A wide range of objectives has been considered by
86. RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 144, 127 DLR
(4th) 1 [RJR-MacDonald].
87. Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp, 2007 SCC 30 at para 38, [2007]
2 SCR 610 [JTI].
88. Copyright Act, supra note 1. Other parts or provisions of the Copyright Act may be held to
have different objectives. For instance, Part VIII of the Copyright Act (ss 79-88), which
legalises the private copying of recorded music in certain circumstances in exchange for
the imposition of a levy on certain types of audio recording music, may be held to have a
different objective than the provisions noted above. In CPCC, the objective of this part was
said to be to ‘legalize[] private copying by a class of users while providing that rightsholders
are compensated for the expropriation of their exclusive rights’. See CPCC, supra note 70 at
para 32. Another part of the Copyright Act that might have a different objective than that of
the provisions noted above is the part that provides legislative protection for technological
protection mechanisms. See, for instance, Copyright Act, supra note 1 at s 41.
89. JTI, supra note 87 at para 37, citing to Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol 2, 5th
ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at 132.
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the SCC to be pressing and substantial.90 Although the list of objectives held to
be pressing and substantial is lengthy, however, not every objective suggested by
the government has been found to be pressing and substantial.91
In Michelin, Justice Teitelbaum stated that he “would have had no difficulty
in determining that the objective of the Copyright Act” was “pressing and
substantial.”92 He also noted that “the pressing and substantial nature of the
Copyright Act’s objective is buttressed by Canada’s international obligations in
treaties like the Berne Convention of 1886 as revised in Berlin in 1908 and in
Rome in 1928.”93
As noted above, the objective of the impugned provisions of the Copyright
Act is conceptualized differently today than it was in 1996. However, for several
reasons, I suggest that a Canadian court would consider the objective of the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act to be pressing and substantial. First,
as noted above, the SCC has considered a wide range of objectives to be pressing
and substantial, demonstrating that the threshold for such a determination
is not overly onerous for governments to meet. As the Constitutional Law
Group notes, “[t]he courts seem prepared to regard almost any purpose …
90. These objectives include “to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information
by organizations in a manner that recognizes both the right of an individual to have his or
her personal information protected and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose
personal information for purposes that are reasonable,” to “reduc[e] the harmful effects
and social costs of discrimination by tackling certain causes of discriminatory activity,” and
providing “a safe, welcoming public transit system,” among many others. See, in order,
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v United Food and Commercial Workers, Local
401, 2013 SCC 62 at para 19, [2013] 3 SCR 733 [Alberta IPC]; Saskatchewan (Human
Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 at para 71, [2013] 1 SCR 467 [Whatcott];
Canadian Federation of Students v Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, 2009 SCC 31
at para 76, [2009] 2 SCR 295.
91. Three objectives rejected by the SCC on the basis that they are not pressing and substantial
are budgetary considerations, “maintaining conventional standards of propriety,
independently of any harm in society,” and “the promotion of marriage.” See, in order,
Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679 at 709, 93 DLR (4th) 1 [Schachter]; Butler,
supra note 30 at 498; Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83 at para 184,
[2002] 4 SCR 325
92. Michelin, supra note 3 at 53. It should be noted that he defines the objective of the Copyright
Act as the protection of authors and ensuring that they are recompensed for their creative
energies and works.
93. Ibid. Craig writes that “[h]aving identified the ultimate purpose of the Copyright Act as
the protection of authors—and not, say, the public interest in encouraging creativity and
the dissemination of intellectual works—the court could hardly avoid the conclusion that
enforcing the author’s monopoly is a rational and efficient means by which to achieve that
purpose.” See Craig, supra note 6 at 91.
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as ‘pressing and substantial.’”94 Second, the granting of a just reward in order
to incentivize the creation and dissemination of expression is connected to “the
realization of collective goals of fundamental importance.”95 One such goal is
the encouragement and dissemination of works of art and the intellect. A wide
range of benefits flow to the public from the existence of such works, including
benefits tied to truth-seeking, democratic discourse, and self-fulfillment. Third,
this objective is neither “trivial” nor “discordant with the principles integral to a
free and democratic society.”96 Rather, the objective of the impugned provisions
advances principles integral to a free and democratic society such as the freedom
of expression of authors and the public. Fourth, as noted by Justice Teitelbaum,
the pressing and substantial nature of the objective is supported by international
treaties, ratified by Canada, that protect copyright.97 Fifth, the pressing and
substantial nature of the objective can also be seen to be supported by international
human rights conventions ratified by Canada, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.98 Vaver writes that “[w]hen the Supreme Court speaks of copyright law’s
need to achieve a ‘proper balance between protection and access,’ the language
echoes the customary international law of human rights treaties such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.”99
The arguments outlined above strongly suggest that should this issue come
before a Canadian court, the objective of the impugned provisions noted above
would be seen as being of pressing and substantial importance “sufficient to
justify some limitation on freedom of expression.”100 A separate question to be
addressed, however, is whether the specific limitations set out in the Copyright
Act can be justified. This question can be answered through the application of the
proportionality branch of the section 1 analysis.

94. Joel Baken et al, eds, Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications, 2010) at 777.
95. JTI, supra note 87 at para 37.
96. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-139, 26 DLR (4th) 200 [Oakes].
97. Michelin, supra note 3 at 50-51. See also R v Lucas, [1998] 1 SCR 439 at para 50, 157 DLR
(4th) 423 [Lucas].
98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171
(entered into force 23 March 1976 accession by Canada 19 May 1979); United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st sess, Supp no
49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007) 1.
99. David Vaver, “Copyright Defences as User Rights” (2013) 60:4 J Copyright Soc’y
USA 661 at 671.
100. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 23.
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C. DO THE IMPUGNED MEASURES SATISFY THE PROPORTIONALITY
BRANCH OF THE SECTION 1 ANALYSIS?

There are three parts to the proportionality branch of the section 1 analysis. First,
it must be asked whether the limit is rationally connected to the objective; second,
whether the limit minimally impairs the right in question; and third, whether the
benefits outweigh the deleterious effects. In applying this test, it is important
to recall the statement in Whatcott that “perfection is not required. Rather the
legislature’s chosen approach must be accorded considerable deference. … [w]e
must ask whether Parliament has chosen one of several reasonable alternatives.”101
D. IS THE LIMIT RATIONALLY CONNECTED TO THE OBJECTIVE?

It is not necessary for the government to conclusively establish that there is a
rational connection between the objective and the means used to promote the
objective (i.e., the limitation). Rather, as noted by Chief Justice McLachlin when
writing for the majority of the SCC in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony, “[t]he government must show that it is reasonable to suppose that the
limit may further the goal, not that it will do so.”102
In JTI, Chief Justice McLachlin noted that although this step is not
“unimportant,” “[f ]ew cases have foundered on the requirement of rational
connection.”103 Some cases have foundered on the requirement of rational
connection, however. For instance, in RJR Macdonald, Chief Justice McLachlin
held that one provision of the Tobacco Products Control Act failed the rational
connection test on the basis that “there is no causal connection based on
direct evidence, nor is there, in my view, a causal connection based in logic
or reason” between “the objective of decreasing tobacco consumption and the
absolute prohibition on the use of a tobacco trade mark on articles other than
tobacco products.”104
How might the rational connection test be applied in the context of the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act? In Michelin, Justice Teitelbaum held

101. Ibid at para 78. Bailey relies on the SCC’s decision in Dunmore to argue that “courts
should [not] defer to Parliament in analyzing the constitutionality of the Act.” See Bailey,
supra note 6 at 151.
102. Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37 at para 48, 310 DLR (4th) 193.
103. JTI, supra note 87 at para 40.
104. RJR-MacDonald, supra note 86 at para 159. See also R v D B, 2008 SCC 25 at para 3, [2008]
2 SCR 3; Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10 at para 54, [2007] 1 SCR 429;
M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 at para 4, 171 DLR (4th) 577.
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that “the objectives of the Copyright Act are rationally connected to an action for
copyright infringement,” concluding that:
There is a definite and efficient link between the goal of protecting the interests of
authors and copyright holders by granting them a monopoly on the right to use
and reproduce their works and the ability to enforce those interests in an action for
copyright infringement.105

As noted above, as a result of the SCC’s re-articulation of the purpose of
copyright—beginning in Théberge and refined through a series of cases including
Cinar—the rational connection analysis must be framed differently. The question
that should be asked, in determining whether this part of the proportionality
analysis is met in the context of my hypothetical case, is whether there is a
rational connection between the objective of granting a just reward to copyright
owners (in order to incentivize the creation and distribution of expression) and
the means of doing so, namely through the grant of limited, assignable, exclusive
statutory rights (including the “ability to enforce those [rights] in an action for
copyright infringement”).106
Is there “conclusive evidence or empirical evidence of a rational connection”
between this objective and the means chosen to achieve this objective?107 A number
of commentators have challenged the idea that copyright incentivizes the creation
of expression.108 Julie Cohen, for instance, writes that “the incentives-for-authors
story is wrong as a descriptive matter.”109 Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman
also question whether the incentives provided by copyright are necessary to
incentivize creativity or innovation in all contexts.110
However, the question of how to incentivize the creation and dissemination
of expression can be considered to be a “complex social problem[],” which
would mean—following JTI—that Parliament’s decision on how to address this
problem “should be accorded considerable deference.”111 Furthermore, it can be
argued that through the application of “reason and logic,” a rational connection
105.
106.
107.
108.

Michelin, supra note 3 at 54.
Ibid at 54.
Toronto Star, supra note 84 at para 25.
See, for instance, Julie Cohen, “Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy”
(2011) 2 Wis L Rev 141; Jessica Silbey, “Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired
Beginnings and Work-Makes-Work, Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and
Innovators” (2011) 86:6 Notre Dame L Rev 2091.
109. Cohen, ibid at 143.
110. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
111. JTI, supra note 87 at para 41.
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between means and objective can be established.112 Hence, it is not unreasonable
to accept that the provision of financial incentives for the creation of works of
expression may encourage at least certain individuals to create those works.
As well, the SCC has stated that “widespread international practice” can
be cited as a “relevant indicator” of a rational connection.113 Granting limited
rights to authors in order to incentivize the creation and dissemination of
works of expression can be said to be a widespread international practice.114
Cohen writes that:
[t]he statement that the purpose of copyright is to furnish incentives for authors
has attained the status of a rote incantation. Court opinions and legislative histories
are peppered with references to the incentives for authors rationale. Judges recite
it as a matter of course when deciding cases, and legislators, lobbyists, and other
interested parties invoke it in debates about proposed amendments to the copyright
laws. Copyright scholars frame policy problems in terms of an “incentives-access”
tradeoff, and that framing in turn affects our analysis of what judges and legislators
do.115

Given the above discussion, I suggest that a Canadian court would find
the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act are rationally connected to
the objective.116
E.

MINIMAL IMPAIRMENT

The second part of the proportionality test can be referred to as the minimal
impairment inquiry. In R v Oakes, in order to satisfy this branch of the
proportionality analysis, the SCC required courts to demonstrate that “the means
… should impair ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in question.”117 Jamie
Cameron notes that “[n]ot surprisingly, a consensus … emerged that Oakes

112. Toronto Star, supra note 84 at para 25.
113. Lavoie v Canada, 2002 SCC 23 at para 59, 210 DLR (4th) 193.
114. Many countries around the world have adopted copyright legislation similar in form
to Canada’s legislation as a mechanism through which to encourage the creation and
dissemination of works. See, for instance, U.S. Copyright Act, 17 USC § 101 (1976);
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), c 48.
115. Cohen, supra note 108 at 142.
116. Bailey expresses doubts that certain provisions of the Copyright Act would satisfy the rational
connection requirement. See Bailey, supra note 6 at 147.
117. Oakes, supra note 94 at 139, citing to R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 352,
18 DLR (4th) 321.
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propounded a strict standard of justification which the Court subsequently
found impossible to implement.”118
In R v St-Onge Lamoureux, Justice Deschamps, writing for the majority,
stated that:
In the minimal impairment inquiry, the court must not second‑guess Parliament
and try to identify the least intrusive solution. In Downey, this Court stated that “…
the issue is ‘whether Parliament could reasonably have chosen an alternative means
which would have achieved the identified objective as effectively’”.119

In Whatcott, the range of alternatives from which Parliament could safely choose
is referred to as the “range of reasonably supportable alternatives.”120
How, then, might the minimal impairment analysis be applied in the context
of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act?121 As described above, I argue
that the objective of the Copyright Act is to provide a fair reward for creators and
copyright owners in order to incentivize the creation of works of the arts and
intellect.122 Parliament has chosen to pursue this objective through the means of
limited exclusive rights granted initially to authors, which can be then transferred
from authors to other parties.
This was not the only means through which Parliament could have provided
a fair reward for creators and copyright owners in order to incentivize the
creation of works. This objective could also have been met, for instance, through
government grants, tax incentives, certificates, medals, or prizes.123 But many
118. Jamie Cameron, “The Original Conception of Section 1 and its Demise: A Comment on
Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-General of Quebec” 35:1 McGill Law Journal 253 at 264. See also
Sujit Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality
Analysis Under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 Sup Ct L Rev 501 at 502.
119. R v St-Onge Lamoureux, 2012 SCC 57 at para 39, 351 DLR (4th) 381.
120. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 101.
121. In Michelin, Justice Teitelbaum found the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act to be
minimally impairing of the Charter right to freedom of expression on the basis that “The
Copyright Act does not prohibit attacks on the authors of works or their ideas. Infringers
are only liable for reproducing the work or a substantial part of the same. Copyright also
minimally impairs the Defendants’ right of free expression by the very well-tailored structure
of the Copyright Act with its list of exceptions in Sections 27(2) and (3).” See Michelin,
supra note 3 at 54.
122. As described above, this view of the purpose of copyright is given support by Chief Justice
McLachlin’s reasons for judgment in Cinar. See Cinar, supra note 58 at para 23.
123. Bruno S Frey and Susanne Neckermann, “Prizes and Awards” in Luigino Bruni and Stefano
Zamagni (eds), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise (Northampton,
Massachussets: Edward Elgar, 2013). See also Lior Zemer, “Rethinking Copyright
Alternatives” (2005) 14:1 Int’l J of L and Info Tech 137 at 138-40. See also Tushnet, supra
note 6 at 27-30.
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jurisdictions around the world have accepted that the creation of limited property
rights in intangible expression through the vehicle of copyright legislation is an
effective way to reward authors and incentivize the creation and distribution
of works of the arts and intellect. Given this widespread view, the decision to
enact a Copyright Act—through which exclusive time-limited rights are granted
in expression, with access to specific remedies, and subject to certain defences—
could be seen as falling squarely within the range of “reasonably supportable
alternatives” from which Parliament could choose in order to fulfill its objective.124
Despite being a reasonable alternative, however, the impugned provisions (or
portions thereof ) could nevertheless fail to be minimally impairing on the basis
that they are overbroad.125 In Whatcott, the SCC listed a number of criticisms
relating to overbreadth.126 Justice Rothstein, writing for the Court, noted that:
Criticisms relating to overbreadth are that the definition or a particular
legislative provision
1. is overreaching and captures more expression than is
intended or necessary;
2. has a chilling effect on public debate, religious expression and media
coverage about moral conduct and social policy;
3. does not give legislative priority to freedom of expression;
4. restricts private communications;
5. should require intention;
6. should require proof of actual harm;
7. should provide for defences, such as a defence of truth.127
In the context of the facts of Whatcott, it was held that the “key to minimizing
both subjectivity and overbreadth” is “[l]inking the test for hate speech to the
specific legislative objectives.”128
Could the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act be held to fail the
minimal impairment part of the proportionality test on the basis that they are
124. Whatcott, supra note 87 at para 101.
125. See, as well, Bailey, who argues that “there are sound conceptual reasons to question whether
the Act actually overcompensates authors for their ‘energies’ and ‘works’ with unnecessarily
broad rights of exclusion.” Bailey, supra note 6 at 145.
126. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 28.
127. Ibid at para 28.
128. Ibid at para 47. For another work that discusses copyright laws in the context of hate speech
and pornography, see Tushnet, supra note 6. Craig also suggests that “a comparison can be
made between copyright law and other laws such as pornography and hate speech regulation
that appear on their face to limit expression but ultimately function to enhance relations of
communication.” See Craig, supra note 6 at 113, n 113.

Reynolds, Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality 926

overbroad? In applying the first criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of
overbreadth, one must ask whether the impugned provisions are overbroad
in that that they “capture[] more expression than is intended or necessary.”129
As noted in Whatcott, “[p]reventative measures should only prohibit the type of
expression expected to cause the harm targeted.”130
Since Théberge, Canadian courts have accepted that copyright in Canada
is primarily an economic right.131 As articulated by Justice Binnie in Théberge,
the rewards provided by copyright are economic rewards, and the type of harm
targeted is economic harm.132 In light of the SCC’s judgment in Cinar and
consistent with the view of the purpose of copyright adopted in this article, the
economic harm targeted can be said to be the harm that flows from acts that
undermine the economic incentive for individuals to create.
If the objective of copyright in Canada is to grant a fair reward to copyright
owners in order to incentivize the creation of works, then—as per Whatcott—the
only type of expression that should be prohibited is expression that affects this
incentive function: that is, expression that denies copyright owners a just or fair
economic reward and in so doing negatively impacts authors’ economic incentive
to create works or, perhaps, distributors’ economic incentive to disseminate works.
Acts that deny a creator a just or fair economic reward might deter him
or her from creating or disseminating works in the future if the promise or
possibility of economic gain acts as an incentivizing factor for his or her creation
or dissemination of works. Cinar provides an informative example. “Dreamer[s]”
like Robinson might not invest “years meticulously crafting an imaginary universe
for an educational children’s television show” if another party could simply
produce (and re-produce) the show without having to compensate Robinson.133
Similarly, intermediaries such as production companies and distributors such
as publishing houses or movie studios might not invest in the production and
dissemination of expression if another publishing house or movie studio could
simply re-produce the same work (in a manner that substitutes for the original
work) without suffering legal sanction or paying compensation.
It could be argued, however, that the impugned provisions of the Copyright
Act “capture[] more expression than is … necessary” to prevent the harm targeted
because they prohibit types of expression that do not deny copyright owners a just
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 28.
Ibid at para 47.
Théberge, supra note 73 at para 12.
Ibid at para 12.
Cinar, supra note 58 at para 3.
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or fair economic reward and thus negatively impact authors’ economic incentive
to create works or distributors’ economic incentive to disseminate works.134
This result is due, in large part, to the structure of the Copyright Act, through
which the infringement provision (section 27) and the rights-granting provision
(section 3 and section 5), taken together, make any taking of a substantial part of
a copyrighted work a prima facie act of copyright infringement, whether or not
it impacts upon the just or fair economic reward to which copyright owners are
entitled under the Copyright Act.135
The extension of the duration of copyright protection in my hypothetical
case could also be overbroad. Increasing the term of copyright protection might
incentivize the creation of certain works that would not have been created had
the term of protection remained at its current length (i.e., the life of the author
plus fifty years). However, the retroactive aspect of this provision might fall afoul
of the section 1 analysis. As written by Justice Stevens in his dissenting judgment
in the US Supreme Court decision in Eldred v Ashcroft, “[n]either the purpose of
encouraging new inventions nor the overriding interest in advancing progress by
adding knowledge to the public domain is served by retroactively increasing the
inventor’s compensation for a completed invention.”136
This view was supported by an amicus curiae brief in support of Eldred’s
position written by a number of prominent economists, including Kenneth J.
Arrow, Ronald Coase, Linda Cohen, and Milton Friedman.137 In addition to
arguing that the present value of additional compensation to authors flowing
from copyright term extension in new works is “small, very likely an improvement
of less than 1% compared to the pre-CTEA term,” these economists argued that
“[t]he term extension for existing works makes no significant contribution to
an author’s incentive to create, since in this case the additional compensation
was granted after the relevant investment had already been made.”138 The brief

134. Whatcott, supra note 88 at para 28 See also Bailey, who argues that “technological
developments … increasingly call into question to what degree (if any), exclusivity is actually
necessary in order to incent creation.” See Bailey, supra note 6 at 147).
135. Copyright Act, supra note 1 at ss 3, 5, 27.
136. Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 at 226, 123 S Ct 769.
137. Brief of George A Akerlof et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2002) (No. 01-618).
138. Ibid at 2.
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concludes that “[t]aken as a whole, it is highly unlikely that the economic benefits
from copyright extension under the CTEA outweigh the additional costs.”139
Applying the second criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth,
might the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act be seen as having a “chilling
effect” on debate or expression?140 This question—in the context of certain
provisions of the Criminal Code relating to terrorism—was addressed in the
2012 SCC decision of R v Khawaja. Chief Justice McLachlin, who wrote the
reasons for judgment for the Court, discussed the “evidentiary basis … required
to establish that legislation has a chilling effect on the exercise of s. 2 freedoms.”141
While “[i]n some situations, a chilling effect can be inferred from known facts
and experience,” she noted that in other instances it is necessary “to call evidence
of a chilling effect.”142 Chief Justice McLachlin held that in the case of Khawaja,
“it is impossible to infer, without evidence, that the motive clause will have a
chilling effect on the exercise of s. 2 freedoms by people holding religious or
ideological views similar to those held by some terrorists.”143
It can be argued that the broad prohibition on the use of copyrighted
material set out in the Copyright Act creates a chilling effect on the unauthorized
use of copyrighted works, or on the circulation of ideas more generally.144 Some
individuals may choose not to express themselves using copyrighted works
rather than risk a copyright infringement lawsuit. However, although there is a
substantial body of literature in the context of copyright that addresses the issue
of chilling effects, the majority of this research has been done in the context of

139. Ibid at 3. For other studies that engage with the question of the evidence for and against
copyright term extension, see Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law,
“Review of the Economic Evidence Relating to an Extension of the Term of Copyright in
Sound Recordings” (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2006); Institute for Information
Law, The Recasting of Copyright and Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy (Amsterdam:
University of Amsterdam, 2006); PricewaterhouseCoopers, The Impact of Copyright Extension
for Sound Recordings in the UK (London: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006).
140. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 28.
141. R v Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69 at para 78, [2012] 3 SCR 555.
142. Ibid at para 79.
143. Ibid at para 80.
144. See Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a
Sabmark International and Another, [2005] ZACC 7 at para 104, 2006 (1) SA 144 [CCSA].
Justice Sachs discussed “the chilling effects that overzealously applied trademark law could
have on the free circulation of ideas.” Ibid at para 104.
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the United States.145 The lack of definitive evidence that the impugned provisions
of Canada’s Copyright Act have had a chilling effect could lead courts to decline to
find the impugned provisions invalid on the basis of overbreadth.146
Applying the third criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth,
do the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act “give legislative priority to
freedom of expression?”147 In some ways, they can be seen to do so. For instance,
the Copyright Act protects neither information nor ideas.148 Furthermore, the
rights of copyright owners with respect to works are limited both in scope and in
duration.149 Additionally, the Copyright Act—by providing mechanisms through
which copyright owners can enjoin the unauthorized use of works in which
they own copyright—can be seen as giving legislative priority to the freedom
of expression interests of authors who continue to own copyright in works
that they create.
In other ways, however, the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act do
not give legislative priority to freedom of expression—specifically, the freedom of
expression of non-copyright owning parties. For instance, the Copyright Act gives
legislative priority to the property rights of copyright owners rather than to the
freedom of expression of non-copyright owning parties. Under the impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act, all unauthorized use by non-copyright owning
parties of a substantial part of copyrighted works is, at first instance, prohibited.
The non-copyright owning party—should they wish to have their use deemed
non-infringing—must establish a defence to copyright infringement. Given the
145. See, for instance, Lumen <https://www.lumendatabase.org>; Wendy Seltzer, “Free Speech
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First
Amendment” (2010) 24:1 Harv J L & Tech 171; Jennifer M Urban & Laura Quilter,
“Efficient Process or Chilling Effects—Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act” (2006) 22:4 Santa Clara Computer and High Technology
Journal 621, Derek J Schaffner, “The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overextension of
Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free Speech, and
Innovation” (2004) 14:1 Cornell J of Law and Pub Pol’y 145.
146. A full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
147. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 28.
148. The question of what constitutes an idea, and what constitutes expression, may be one that is
difficult to determine. See Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp, 45 F 2d 119 at 121, 7 USPQ 84
[1931]. Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Upon any work … a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well,
as more and more of the incident is left out. … [T]here is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
‘ideas,’ to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can. (Ibid).

149. Copyright Act, supra note 1 at ss 3, 5, 6-12, 29-30.9.
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cost of defending a lawsuit in court,150 one might wonder whether individuals
who might be able to benefit from the defences set out in the Copyright Act will
be in a position to exercise this right.
Furthermore, there is no mention of freedom of expression in the Copyright
Act. The absence of a provision confirming the importance of freedom of expression
can be contrasted with, among other examples, the hate speech provisions of
Saskatchewan’s Human Rights Code.151 Section 14(2) of the Human Rights Code
provides that “[n]othing in subsection (1) restricts the right of freedom of
expression under the law upon any subject.”152 The SCC, in Whatcott, cited this
provision as an indication that “[t]he Saskatchewan legislature recognized the
importance of freedom of expression,” and noted that “[t]he legislative objective
of the entire provision is to address harm from hate speech while limiting
freedom of expression as little as possible.”153 The absence of an equivalent provision
in the context of the Copyright Act could be interpreted as an indication that
Parliament has not recognized the importance of freedom of expression in the
context of copyright.
Applying the fourth criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth,
the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act restrict private communications.
For instance, if Party A sends an email to Party B that contains a copyrighted
attachment, and Party B opens and downloads this attachment, this could
constitute copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, in that Party B could
be found to have infringed copyright by reproducing the work. In order for Party
B’s act to be found not to be infringing, Party B must establish that the act was
covered by a defence to copyright infringement, such as fair dealing.
Applying the fifth criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth,
the Copyright Act does not require intention for copyright infringement to be
made out. The infringing party must merely commit a prima facie infringement
for which no defence applies. As noted by Justice Teitelbaum in Michelin, “the
intention of the infringer, whether or not in commercial competition with the
copyright holder, is irrelevant to the question of infringement.”154
Applying the sixth criticism noted in Whatcott in the context of overbreadth,
the Copyright Act does not require proof of actual harm for a finding of copyright
150. See, for instance, Michael McKiernan, “The Going Rate” (2014) 39:6 Canadian
Lawyer Magazine 33.
151. SS 1979, c S‑24.1, s 14.
152. Ibid.
153. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 110 [emphasis added].
154. Michelin, supra note 3 at 23. See also James Lorimer, supra note 3 at 1073.
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infringement. Proof that a party has done something that the copyright owner
has the right to do is sufficient, in the absence of a defence, to ground a successful
action for copyright infringement. Though the party whose copyright has been
infringed is entitled to an accounting of profits, they can alternatively elect to
recover an award of statutory damages without demonstrating actual harm.155
The creation of a statutory regime that imposes liability without harm is
not unique to copyright. Such an approach also exists in the context of hate
speech. Justice Rothstein wrote in Whatcott that “the imposition of preventive
measures that do not require proof of actual harm” can be justified in part by “the
difficulty of establishing a causal link between an expressive statement and the
resulting hatred.”156 A similar justification has been used to justify the imposition
of statutory damages regimes in the context of copyright.157
As noted in Whatcott, in some situations in which it is difficult to establish
a causal link between the act and the harm flowing from the act, courts have
accepted that a “reasonable apprehension of harm” approach should be applied.
Under this approach, “a precise causal link for certain societal harms [is] not …
required. A court is entitled to use common sense and experience in recognizing
that certain activities … inflict societal harms.”158 Justice Rothstein continues:
In Thomson Newspapers Co., this Court recognized that a reasonable apprehension
of harm test should be applied in cases where “it has been suggested, though not
proven, that the very nature of the expression in question undermines the position of
groups or individuals as equal participants in society” (para. 115). Such an approach
is warranted “when it is difficult or impossible to establish scientifically the type of
harm in question” (para. 115).159

Should a “reasonable apprehension of societal harm” test be applied in the context
of the unauthorized use of copyrighted works or should “a precise causal link” be
required?160 It could be argued that certain types or instances of unauthorized uses
of copyrighted works undermine the position of authors as equal participants in
society. One example where this might be the case is where someone creates a
work that is then acquired and published, without authorization and without
compensation, by a different individual (a Cinar-type situation). The act of
publication of this work conveys meaning and thus prima facie constitutes
155. Copyright Act, supra note 1 at s 38.1.
156. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 129.
157. Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, “Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy
in Need of Reform” (2009) 51:2 Wm & Mary L Rev 439 at 446.
158. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 132.
159. Ibid at para 133.
160. Ibid at paras 132-33.
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expression under section 2(b). However, it also impacts the ability of the author
to act as an equal participant by denying them all financial benefits from the
commercialization of their creation. In this situation, a Court might not “demand
a scientific demonstration or the submission of definitive social science evidence
to establish that the line drawn by Parliament was perfectly drawn.”161
However, not all instances or types of copyright infringement can be seen
as undermining the position of an author as an equal participant in society. For
instance, in what ways are authors impacted by the unauthorized, non-commercial
use of their works by individuals for their own creative endeavours? Even if the
author has lost a potential licensing fee, can this be said to undermine the position
of an author as an equal participant in society? In this type of situation, it could
be argued that a reasonable apprehension of harm test should not be applied, and
the plaintiff should be required to demonstrate proof of economic harm.
The seventh criticism noted in Whatcott is that legislation, in order not to
be found to be overbroad, “should provide for defences, such as a defence of
truth.”162 Numerous defences are set out in the Copyright Act, and their number
and scope were expanded as part of the 2012 amendment process. These defences
can be seen as providing space within which non-copyright owners can express
themselves using copyrighted works.163 Questions can be raised, however,
as to whether these defences are sufficiently broad and whether they are too
vaguely worded to be useful to defendants.164
To summarize, although the impugned provisions fall squarely within the
range of reasonably supportable alternatives that could have been selected by
Parliament to address the objective of providing an incentive for the creation
and dissemination of expression, it is possible—based on the SCC’s decisions in
Whatcott and Khawaja—that the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act could
161. Thomson Newspapers Co v Canada (Attorney General), [1998] 1 SCR 877 at para 116,
159 DLR (4th) 385.
162. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 28.
163. Fewer, for instance, refers to defences to copyright infringement as “legal mechanisms [that]
embrac[e] [expressive] values.” See Fewer, supra note 6 at 202.
164. Fewer critiques the way in which fair dealing was applied by a number of Canadian courts
in the late 1990s, arguing that “interpretational deficienc[ies] abuse[] freedom of expression
in Canada.” As well, in the US context, Rebecca Tushnet argues that fair use “is too vague
to provide enough guidance,” stating that “[b]ecause the outcome of any particular case is
uncertain, a potential infringer/fair user has to be willing to bear the substantial costs of
litigation for a chance to escape liability. This seems quite likely to prompt self-censorship.”
See Fewer, supra note 6 at 205-209; Tushnet, supra note 6 at 24. See also Timothy
A O Endicott and Michael J Spence, “Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright” (2005)
121:4 Law Q Rev 657.
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be held to fail to meet the minimal impairment requirement on the basis that
they are overbroad. In light of this possibility, it is useful to apply the third and
final step of the proportionality analysis.
F.

DO THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGH THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS

The last part of the section 1 analysis “requires an assessment of whether the
importance of the legislative objective of [the impugned provision] … outweighs
the deleterious effects of the provision.”165 In engaging in this balancing exercise,
the value of the expression must be considered. In their dissenting judgment in
R v Sharpe, Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, and Bastarache wrote that:
The more distant the expression from the core values underlying the right, the more
likely action restricting it can be justified …. Defamatory libel, hate speech and
pornography are far removed from the core values of freedom of expression and
have been characterized as low value expression, which merits an attenuated level
of constitutional protection …. These forms of expression receive an attenuated
level of constitutional protection not because a lower standard of justification is
applied to the government, but because the low value of the expression is more easily
outweighed by the objective of the infringing legislation.166

What is the importance of the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act?
In the context of my hypothetical case, one can question what benefits flow
from granting additional protection to works already created.167 On the other
hand, the deleterious effects of these provisions may include restrictions on
the work’s circulation, which could impact upon the ability of individuals to
access the expression and which in turn might impact individuals’ ability to use
this expression in the service of self-fulfillment, truth-finding, or democratic
discourse. These negative effects might be particularly severe in the context of
works that are not widely available.
Do the deleterious effects of these provisions outweigh their beneficial
impacts? In considering this question, courts must balance a number of factors,
including whether the expression in question is “low value” expression. Is A’s use
of copyrighted expression “low value” expression similar to defamatory libel,168

165. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 147.
166. Sharpe, supra note 38 at para 181.
167. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
supra note 135; “Review of the Economic Evidence Relating to an Extension of the Term of
Copyright in Sound Recordings” supra note 139; The Impact of Copyright Extension for Sound
Recordings in the UK, supra note 139.
168. Lucas, supra note 97.
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hate speech,169 information about tobacco products and product brands,170 and
pornography?171 If it can be characterized as such, then it is possible that the
benefits outlined above—however marginal they might be—might be found to
outweigh the detrimental effects.
Expression that has been characterized by the SCC as “low value” does not
advance, to any great degree, the core values of freedom of expression (namely the
search for truth, self-fulfillment, and political participation). For instance, Justice
Sopinka wrote in Butler that:
the distribution of sexually explicit materials accompanied by violence, and those
without violence that are degrading or dehumanizing … lies far from the core of the
guarantee of freedom of expression in that it appeals only to the most base aspect of
individual fulfilment, and it is primarily economically motivated.172

However, the expressive act in my hypothetical case advances the core values
of freedom of expression. Specifically, A’s making available works the copyright in
which would have expired were it not for a legislative amendment extending the
term of copyright advances the search for truth by making these works accessible
to a broader range of individuals, enhances the self-fulfilment of all who read the
works who would otherwise not have done so by giving them the opportunity
to engage with its content, and—depending on the nature of the works and
the actions taken by individuals after engaging with them—may enhance
participation in social and political decision making.
The question of whether the expression is of low value is not the only
question to be considered in this aspect of the section 1 analysis, however.
As noted in Whatcott, the freedom of expression values furthered by the expression
in question must also be balanced “with competing Charter rights and other
values essential to a free and democratic society.”173 Competing Charter rights
that must be balanced in the section 1 analysis in the context of my hypothetical
case are the freedom of expression of the public and of authors, whether or not
they continue to own copyright in the works that they create.174

169.
170.
171.
172.

R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697, 61 CCC (3d) 1.
JTI-Macdonald, supra note 87.
Sharpe, supra note 38.
Butler, supra 30 at para 120. See also Sharpe, ibid at para 24; Lucas, supra note 97 at para 73;
JTI, supra note 87 at paras 68, 94, & 115.
173. Whatcott, supra note 88 at para 66.
174. See, for instance, Paul Torremans, “Is Copyright a Human Right?” [2007] Mich St L
Rev 271 at 290.
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Furthermore, as a result of Cinar, copyright owners’ property rights and
authors’ rights to inviolability and dignity might also need to be balanced.175
It is unclear, however, whether infringements of the authors’ rights to inviolability
and to dignity could be held to have occurred in all instances of copyright
infringement or only in situations analogous to Cinar where the author remains
the copyright owner.
Canadian courts have also held that balancing, in the context of the section 1
analysis, should “take into account Canada’s international obligations with respect
to international law treaty commitments.”176 As stated in Whatcott, “[t]hose
commitments reflect an international recognition that certain types of expression
may be limited in furtherance of other fundamental values.”177 In the context
of copyright law, international obligations that should be considered include
international copyright and intellectual property treaties that Canada has signed
and are in force—namely the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performs, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, the WIPO Convention, the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty, and TRIPS.178
Canada’s international commitments, however, are not limited to copyright
or intellectual property more broadly. Other types of treaties and international
commitments that should be considered in the balancing process include human
rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

175. Cinar, supra note 58 at paras 113-117. Fewer, as well, notes that courts considering claims
for copyright infringement have, on occasion, “privilege[d] the privacy rights of individuals
over the public interest in the dissemination of knowledge.” Privacy is thus another right that
might need to be balanced at this stage of the s 1 analysis. See Fewer, supra note 6 at 198.
176. Whatcott, supra note 90 at para 67, citing to Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor,
[1990] 3 SCR 892 at 916.
177. Whatcott, ibid at para 67.
178. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886,
as revised at Paris on July 24 1971 and amended in 1979, S Treaty Doc No 99-27 (1986);
1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, 26 October 1961, 496 UNTS 43; Convention Establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization, 14 July 1967, 828 UNTS 3; WIPO Copyright
Treaty, 20 December 1996, 2186 UNTS 121; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
20 December 1996, 2186 UNTS 2013; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299 [TRIPS].
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Peoples, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.179
Ultimately, a Canadian court could determine that the benefits of the impugned
provisions—in the context of my hypothetical case or in other contexts as
discussed in the conclusion—might not outweigh their detrimental effects.

III. REMEDIES FOR BREACH
In the previous section, I argued that in the context of my hypothetical case
(as well as in several other contexts), the impugned provisions of the Copyright
Act might not be justified under section 1 because they are overbroad or their
deleterious effects outweigh their beneficial effects. This section will examine
the options available to a court should it determine that the impugned
provisions of the Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the section 2(b) right to
freedom of expression.
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 states that “[t]he Constitution of
Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force
or effect.”180 Multiple remedies, including striking down, severing, and reading
in, are available to a court under section 52(1).181
Canadian courts are limited in their ability to read in or sever elements of
statutory provisions. In Schachter, the Court noted that severance and reading
in are appropriate remedies only where the inconsistency or the extension
“can be defined with some precision on the basis of the requirements of the
Constitution.”182 As Justice Lamer noted in his majority reasons in Schachter,
in situations in which “the question of how the statute ought to be extended
in order to comply with the Constitution cannot be answered with a sufficient
degree of precision on the basis of constitutional analysis … it is the legislature’s
role to fill in the gaps, not the court’s.”183 This principle applies directly in
179. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GTA
Res 217A(III), UNGAOR, 3rd sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) 71; Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GTA Res 106, UNGAOR, 61st sess, Supp No 49,
UN Doc A/61/106 (1948) 2. Bailey has written in detail on the ways in which the SCC’s
interpretation of the s 2(b) right to freedom of expression is consistent with its international
human rights obligations. See Bailey, supra note 6 at 134.
180. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 52(1).
181. Schachter, supra note 91 at 705.
182. Ibid at 705.
183. Ibid.
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the context of copyright. In the previous section, I argued that a court could
conclude that the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act are overbroad. That
is to say, as described in JTI and Whatcott and applied in the context of copyright,
a court could determine that the impugned provisions either “on [their] face
catch[] more expression than necessary to meet the legislator’s objective,”184 or are
overbroad due to vagueness.
Depending on how the offending provisions are drafted, severing might
be the most appropriate remedy. This would only be the case, however, if the
offending portion could be severed without the court being required to “fill in
… details”185 or to “make ad hoc choices.”186 If it is held that there are a number
of ways through which the impugned provisions could be modified to address
concerns relating to overbreadth (for instance by expanding defences to copyright
infringement or by adopting new interpretive principles), then severance and
reading in would be inappropriate.
In Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v New Brunswick,
Justice Gonthier noted that multiple approaches could be taken to remedy the
Charter breach in question.187 He stated further that “it is not appropriate for
this Court to dictate the approach that should be taken in order to rectify the
situation. Since there is more than one way to do so, it is the government’s task
to determine which approach it prefers.”188 Attempts by courts to re-craft the
impugned provisions of the Copyright Act could be criticized on the basis that
they “amount to making ad hoc choices from a variety of options” and pay
insufficient respect to the role of the legislature.189
This argument—that it would be inappropriate for a Canadian court to craft
legislative amendments to remedy copyright’s constitutional issues in contexts
where there is more than one way in which these amendments could be framed—
is given support by the SCC’s decision in Rocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons
of Ontario.190 In Rocket, the SCC found that the impugned regulation violated
section 2(b) of the Charter and could not be justified under section 1 on the
184.
185.
186.
187.

JTI, supra note 87 at para 78.
Schachter, supra note 91 at para 52.
Ibid at para 56.
Mackin v New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), 187 NBR (2d) 224, 69 ACWS (3d) 846
(NBCA); Rice v New Brunswick, 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 SCR 405.
188. Rice v New Brunswick, ibid at para 77.
189. Schachter, supra note 91 at 707. See also M v H, supra note 104 at para 139.
190. Rocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 SCR 232, 71 DLR (4th) 68
[Rocket]. See also Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 169, 11 DLR (4th) 64, cited
in Schachter, ibid at 169.
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basis of overbreadth. Rather than reading in additional exceptions, the SCC
struck down the regulation. It did so due in large part to the structure of the
regulation itself, which “starts with an absolute prohibition on all advertising,
[and goes]… on to set out exceptions.”191 Chief Justice McLachlin referred to this
method of legislative drafting as “almost certain to raise the spectre of Charter
infringement.”192 Further, “[b]ecause the section is cast in the form of limited
exclusions to a general prohibition, the Court would be required to supply
further exceptions. To my mind, this is for the legislators.”193 In a similar manner,
it could be argued that the prohibition against the use of copyright-protected
expression “would be justifiable if additional exceptions were added.”194 For
instance, the incorporation of additional categories into the fair dealing defence,
or the creation of additional defences, could address concerns of overbreadth
both in the context of my hypothetical case or more broadly. However, following
Rocket, the creation of additional exceptions would be a matter for the legislators,
not the courts.
Given the limitations of reading in and severance as possible remedies, a court
could find that the most appropriate remedy would be a declaration of invalidity.
To what should this declaration of apply? As described earlier this article, the
impugned provisions—those that I have argued restrict the section 2(b) right
to freedom of expression—are section 27(1) of the Copyright Act (the general
infringement provision), when read in context with the provisions granting rights
in works (sections 3 and 5), the primary remedy provisions (sections 34, 38.1
and 42), and the provisions setting out defences (sections 29-30.9) and other
limitations to copyright—for instance term limits, as amended (sections 6-12).195
There is considerable overlap between a number of these provisions. The general
infringement provision (section 27(1)), for instance, can only be understood in
light of the provision articulating the rights granted to copyright owners (section
3), the provision setting out the conditions of subsistence of copyright (section
5), and the provision setting out the term of copyright (sections 6-12). It would
thus be difficult for a court to remedy any constitutional violation involving these
provisions by invalidating a single provision. A similar fact situation is found in
R v Guignard, in which Justice Lebel, writing for the SCC, held that “[b]ecause
of the considerable overlap between the definitions and the provision imposing
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Rocket, ibid at 250.
Ibid at para 253.
Ibid at para 252.
Schachter, supra note 91 at 706, discussing Rocket.
Copyright Act, supra note 1.
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the ban, the declaration of nullity must apply to both the definition and the ban
itself.”196 This passage suggests that should one or more impugned provisions
be found to be inconsistent with the Charter, all overlapping provisions could
(and perhaps should) be struck down. Drawing from Bedford, Parliament would
then be able to “devise a new approach, reflecting different elements of the
existing regime.”197
Should this declaration extend beyond specific provisions to the legislation
as a whole? This question has been addressed by the SCC in several decisions,
including M v H and Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v United Food
and Commercial Workers, Local 401.198 One question to be asked in considering
this issue is whether Parliament would have enacted the legislation without the
impugned provisions. If it cannot be assumed that it would have done so, then
this is an indication that the statute should be struck down in its entirety.
In M v H, the SCC determined that the legislature would have enacted
the legislation without the constitutionally impermissible provisions.199 In the
context of my hypothetical case, it might be assumed that Parliament would have
enacted the copyright term extension without making it retroactive. However,
in other contexts in which the constitutionality of copyright is challenged, this
assumption might not be valid. For example, one decision in which the SCC
determined that it could not conclude that the legislature would have enacted the
legislation without the impugned provisions was Alberta (IPC).200 This decision
dealt with the constitutionality of specific provisions of Alberta’s Personal
Information Protection Act (PIPA).201 Justices Abella and Cromwell, writing for
the Court, stated that “[g]iven the comprehensive and integrated structure of the
statute, we do not think it is appropriate to pick and choose among the various
amendments that would make PIPA constitutionally compliant.”202 As a result,
the SCC struck down PIPA in its entirety.
Similar to PIPA, the Copyright Act possesses an integrated structure. The
primary infringement provision (section 27), for instance, must be read together
with the rights-granting provision (section 3 for works), which itself must be
read alongside the provision detailing the conditions for subsistence of copyright
196. R v Guignard, 2002 SCC 14 at para 32, [2002] 1 SCR 472 [Guignard].
197. Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para 165, [2013] 3 SCR
1101 [Bedford].
198. Alberta (IPC), supra note 90.
199. M v H, supra note 104 at para 144.
200. Supra note 90.
201. SA 2003, c P-6.5 [PIPA].
202. Alberta (IPC), supra note 90 at para 40.
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(section 5) and the provisions setting out the term of copyright in works (sections
6-12). Given the integrated structure of the Copyright Act, and following Alberta
(Information and Privacy Commissioner), it can be argued that should it be
found that one or more provisions of the Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe
the Charter-protected right to freedom of expression, that it may be more
appropriate to strike down the Copyright Act in its entirety than to invalidate a
specific provision or a number of provisions.
In suggesting that a declaration of invalidity might be the most appropriate
remedy in certain contexts, the next question that must be asked is whether
the declaration of invalidity should apply immediately, or whether it would be
appropriate for the Court to grant a temporary suspension of this declaration.
Canadian courts have indicated their discomfort in granting a suspended
declaration of invalidity. In Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop, for instance,
Justices LeBel and Rothstein, writing for the majority, stated that the effect
of granting a suspended declaration of invalidity is to “extend[s] the life of a
unconstitutional law.”203 As noted by Justice Deschamps in her dissenting reasons
in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney
General), “[g]enerally, the Court should be wary of allowing or appearing to
condone a continued state of affairs that violates Charter rights.”204
The SCC gave guidance in Schachter as to the types of situations in which
temporary suspensions of invalidity could be issued. Chief Justice Lamer wrote
that a suspension of invalidity is “clearly appropriate where the striking down
of a provision poses a potential danger to the public … or otherwise threatens
the rule of law.”205 He also suggested that suspensions of invalidity “may also be
appropriate in cases of underinclusiveness as opposed to overbreadth.”206 In these
types of cases, were an underinclusive law to be struck down, deserving persons
might be deprived of benefits “without providing them to the applicant.”207 Since
Schachter, other justifications for granting a temporary suspension of invalidity
have been articulated by the SCC in cases including Bedford and Kingstreet
Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Finance).208

203. Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop, supra note 104 at para 92.
204. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General), 2004
SCC 4 at para 244, [2004] 1 SCR 76.
205. Schachter, supra note 91 at 715.
206. Ibid at 715.
207. Ibid at 715-716.
208. Bedford, supra note 198 at para 167; Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Finance),
2007 SCC 1 at para 25, [2007] 1 SCR 3 [Kingstreet Investments].
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The possibility that a court might grant a declaration of invalidity should
the Copyright Act be found to be invalid in whole or part is supported by the
reasoning from the three cases noted above (Schachter, Bedford, and Kingstreet).
First, although striking down the Copyright Act would pose no risk to public
safety, it would deprive deserving people of benefits. Among those who would be
deprived of benefits should the Copyright Act be struck down are authors who are
copyright owners whose works could be used by anyone in any context (including
a commercially competitive context) without the possibility of recourse. Second,
drawing from Bedford, it can be suggested that given the increasing prominence of
copyright in Canadian public discourse, “moving abruptly from a situation where
[intangible expression] is regulated to a situation where it is entirely unregulated
would be a matter of great concern to many Canadians.”209 Third, given economic
data on the importance of copyright to Canada’s economy, it is likely that—as
was the case in Kingstreet—evidence would be led “establishing a real concern
about fiscal chaos” should the Copyright Act be struck down.210
If a temporary suspension is granted, for how long might it be granted? The
SCC has suspended declarations of invalidity under the Charter in twenty-one
decisions.211 In all but one case, the SCC granted suspensions of either six, twelve,
or eighteen months.212 In total, in two out of twenty-one cases (10%) in which
suspensions of invalidity were granted, the SCC suspended the declaration for
a period of eighteen months;213 in eleven out of twenty-one cases (52%), the

209. Bedford, ibid at para 167. In 2009, Canada’s federal government launched a public
consultation on copyright in conjunction with the introduction of Bill C-61. Michael
Geist writes that “[t]here were ultimately more than 8,300 submissions—more than any
government consultation in recent memory.” See Michael Geist, “The Final Copyright
Consultation Numbers: No Repeat of Bill C-61” (April 9, 2010) Michael Geist (blog),
online: <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2010/04/copycon-final-numbers/>.
210. Kingstreet Investments, supra note 209 at para 25. See, for instance, CONNECTUS
Consulting Inc, The Economic Impact of Canadian Copyright Industries—Sectoral Analysis
(2006); Conference Board of Canada, Valuing Culture: Measuring and Understanding
Canada’s Creative Economy (2008).
211. This article is current as of 12 March 2016.
212. The one exception is re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 SCR 721, 19 DLR (4th) 1.
Here, the SCC “declare[d] all the unilingual Acts of the Legislature of Manitoba to be invalid
and of no force and effect.” In this case, the SCC held that a special hearing should be set to
determine the period of temporary validity. Ibid, at 754, 769.
213. Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203, 173 DLR
(4th) 1; Dunmore, supra note 11.

Reynolds, Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality 942

SCC suspended the declaration for a period of twelve months;214 and in seven
out of twenty-one cases (33%), the SCC suspended the declaration for a period
of six months.215
However, the last case in which the SCC suspended a declaration of invalidity
for a period other than twelve months was the 2003 decision of Nova Scotia
(Worker’s Compensation Board) v Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation
Board) v Laseur.216 Since this date, the SCC has granted suspended declarations
of invalidity in nine cases, all for a period of twelve months.217 It appears most
likely that if a court decides to suspend a declaration of invalidity, it would do so
for a period of twelve months.
This analysis is supported by remarks made by the SCC as to the appropriate
length of time for which to suspend the effect of a declaration of invalidity.
In Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), the effect
of the declaration of invalidity was suspended for eighteen months.218 Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé referred to the length of this suspension, in her dissenting
reasons, as “longer than the period that would normally be allotted in order
to give legislators the time necessary to carry out extensive consultations and

214. Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1998] 2
SCR 443, 150 DLR (4th) 577; Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2003 SCC
34, [2003] 1 SCR 835; R v Demers, 2004 SCC 46, [2004] 2 SCR 489; Charkaoui v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350; Confédération des syndicats
nationaux v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 SCC 68, [2008] 3 SCR 511; Nguyen v Quebec
(Education, Recreation and Sports), 2009 SCC 47, [2009] 3 SCR 208; R v Tse, 2012 SCC
16, [2012] 1 SCR 531; Alberta (IPC), supra note 85; Bedford, supra note 196; Saskatchewan
Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245; Carter v Canada,
2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter]. In Carter, the SCC, in January 2016, granted a
four-month extension of the suspension of the declaration of invalidity. See Carter v Canada
(15 January 2016), Ottawa, SCC 35591 (Order Motion).
215. R v Bain, [1992] 1 SCR 91, 87 DLR (4th) 449; Eurig Estate (Re), [1998] 2 SCR 565, 165
DLR (4th) 1; M v H, supra note 101; United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1518
(UFCW) v Kmart Canada Ltd, [1999] 2 SCR 1083, 176 DLR (4th) 607; Mackin v New
Brunswick (Minister of Finance), supra note 185; Rice v New Brunswick, supra note 185;
Guignard, supra note 197; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin, 2003 SCC
54, [2003] 2 SCR 504.
216. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin, ibid.
217. R v Demers, supra note 215; Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), supra note
215; Confédération des syndicats nationaux v Canada (Attorney General), supra note 215;
Nguyen v Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), supra note 215; R v Tse, supra note 215;
Alberta (IPC), supra note 90; Bedford, supra note 198; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v
Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4, [2015] 1 SCR 245; Carter, supra note 215.
218. Corbiere, supra note 215.
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respond to the needs of the different groups affected.”219 A suspension of twelve
months, on the other hand, was referred to by Chief Justice Lamer in his
dissenting reasons in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) as “giv[ing]
Parliament adequate time to decide what, if any, legislation should replace [the
impugned provision].”220

IV. CONCLUSION
In this article I have explored, in the context of a hypothetical case relating to
copyright term extension, whether specific provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act
infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression, and, if so, whether they
can be justified through the application of a section 1 analysis. These questions
were considered by Justice Teitelbaum in Michelin. As noted above, he held that
specific provisions of the Copyright Act did not infringe the Charter-protected
right to freedom of expression and, even if they did, they would be saved by
a section 1 analysis. Since Michelin, these conclusions have been treated by
Canadian courts as settled.
A number of commentators, however—including Fewer, Bailey, Craig, and
Amani—have argued that these conclusions ought not to be seen as settled, and
that elements of Canada’s Copyright Act, as written or as applied, are inconsistent
with the section 2(b) right to freedom of expression.221 This article, in which
I resituate the analysis of copyright’s constitutionality in light of recent SCC
jurisprudence in the areas of both copyright and freedom of expression, adds to
and builds on these works.
Specifically, I have argued that A’s making available of copyrighted works
constitutes protectable expression and that core provisions of Canada’s Copyright
Act infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression in purpose and effect.
As well, I have argued that these provisions might not be justified through the
application of a section 1 analysis. Drawing in particular from the SCC’s decision
in Whatcott, I have argued that although the impugned provisions should be
seen as rationally connected to this objective, they may be found to be overbroad
219. Ibid at para 118.
220. Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 at 570,
107 DLR (4th) 342.
221. Fewer, supra note 6; Bailey, supra note 6; Craig, supra note 6; Amani, supra note 6. Bailey,
for instance, suggests that the “[Copyright] Act as currently structured cannot be assumed
to be consistent with freedom of expression, and that the justifiability of the violation is
by no means a foregone conclusion—particularly in the digital networked context.” See
Bailey, ibid at 156.
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and thus not minimally impairing. In addition, their detrimental effects may be
found to be disproportionate to their benefits.
If a court determines that the impugned provisions of the Copyright Act
infringe section 2(b) and that this infringement cannot be justified under
section 1, the question turns to remedies. In the context of my hypothetical
case, I suggested that the constitutionality of the impugned provision could be
addressed by severing part of the provision. Depending on how the provision
is drafted, however, my analysis of relevant SCC case law suggests that—
perhaps surprisingly—in order to avoid usurping the role of Parliament, a court
considering the constitutionality of specific provisions of Canada’s Copyright Act
should strike down either part of the Copyright Act or the Copyright Act in its
entirety rather than trying to re-shape it (for instance through the addition of
exceptions or defences to copyright infringement). I have argued that if a court
strikes down the legislation in whole or part, it is likely that any declaration of
invalidity would be suspended for a period of twelve months. Such a remedy
would give Parliament the opportunity to remake Canada’s Copyright Act in ways
that are consistent with what the Charter requires.
The purpose of this article has been to demonstrate that the Copyright Act
is not immune from freedom of expression scrutiny; that certain provisions of
the Copyright Act, depending on the context in which they are engaged, may
unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression; and that,
as a result, Canadian courts should reconsider the relationship between the Charter
right to freedom of expression and copyright. A number of possible consequences
could flow from a reconsideration of this intersection First, such reconsideration
would provide Canadian courts with opportunities for further engagement with
a number of legal issues that merit attention, including the purpose or objective
of copyright. As described above, the purpose of copyright is an integral aspect of
both the section 2(b) and section 1 analyses under the Charter. In Cinar, Chief
Justice McLachlin wrote that copyright “seeks to ensure that an author will reap
the benefits of his efforts, in order to incentivize the creation of new works.”222
Yet she also demonstrated an openness to considering additional justifications
of copyright through her characterization of the acts of copyright infringement
in Cinar as having violated Robinson’s “personal rights to inviolability and to
dignity.”223 Reconsidering the intersection between copyright and the Charter
right to freedom of expression would provide Canadian courts with additional
opportunities to consider the extent to which values such as dignity and
222. Cinar, supra note 59 at para 23.
223. Ibid at para 114.
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autonomy—among others—either are or should be embedded within Canadian
copyright law. Judicial reconsideration of this intersection could also result in
further modifications to the section 2(b) and section 1 analyses themselves. What
is more, it could create additional opportunities for courts and commentators to
engage in further consideration of either the intersection of copyright and other
Charter-protected rights or the intersection of intellectual property rights other
than copyright and the Charter.
Second, Canadian courts’ reconsideration of the intersection of copyright
and the Charter right to freedom of expression could lead more individuals to
engage—in different ways, and from different perspectives—with this intersection.
For instance, consideration by the SCC of the intersection of copyright and the
Charter right to freedom of expression might lead to a spike in empirical research
on copyright law topics. As noted above, evidence plays an important role in the
section 1 analysis. It can be used both by government to “justify the law’s impact
in terms of society as a whole,” or by other parties (including interveners) to
argue that the law is neither rationally connected to the objective nor minimally
impairing.224 Choudhry writes that “the central debate in many section 1 cases is
the quality of the evidentiary record.”225 Reconsideration of the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright by Canadian courts could
also lead Canadian constitutional and freedom of expression scholars to engage
with the intersection of copyright and the Charter right to freedom of expression
to a greater degree than has previously been the case. Three of the most prominent
constitutional law casebooks and textbooks used in Canadian law schools make
no reference to copyright in the context of freedom of expression.226 Engagement
with this intersection by constitutional scholars would bring a perspective that is
thus far lacking in Canadian commentary in this area.
Third, Canadian courts’ reconsideration of the intersection of copyright and
the Charter right to freedom of expression could lead courts in other jurisdictions
to reconsider the way in which they approach this intersection. Anne-Marie
Slaughter has described the SCC as “highly influential, apparently more so than
the US Supreme Court and other older and more established constitutional

224. Bedford, supra note 198 at para 126.
225. Choudhry, supra note 118 at 504.
226. See Hogg, Group, Guy Régimbald and Dwight Newman, The Law of the Canadian
Constitution, 1st edn (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2013). The absence of discussion of copyright
in the context of these works can be contrasted with Eric Barendt’s textbook Freedom of
Speech, which contains an entire chapter on “Copyright and Other Property Rights.” See Eric
Barendt, Freedom of Speech, 2nd edn (London: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 247-67.
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courts.”227 The way in which the SCC articulates the relationship between
freedom of expression and copyright may thus influence the articulation of this
relationship in other jurisdictions.
Fourth, as argued above, Canadian courts’ reconsideration of the intersection
of copyright and the Charter right to freedom of expression could result in certain
provisions of the Copyright Act being declared of no force or effect, which would
necessitate its reform. My hypothetical case focused on copyright term extension.
However, as noted above, I am not suggesting that my conclusions are restricted
to this specific case. Other scenarios that could have been considered include
those in which fair dealing’s limits are challenged (for instance if an individual
creates a “transformative work” that, although fair, falls outside of the fair dealing
categories228); those in which an individual is sued for copyright infringement for
making an unauthorized, personal copy of a work; those that challenge Canada’s
moral rights regime (for instance due to the absence of free-standing defences to
moral rights infringement); or those that challenge the provisions in Canada’s
Copyright Act that make it an offence, in certain circumstances, to circumvent
technological protection measures.
In any of these situations, a declaration that all or part of the Copyright
Act is of no force or effect would create an opportunity for governments,
non-governmental organisations, corporations, artists, scholars and others to
suggest ways to re-make copyright in forms consistent with the Charter. It would,
as Eric Barendt argues, give “[c]ourts, and writers on freedom of speech as well as
on copyright” the chance to “confront th[e] clash of speech and property rights
openly, and develop principles under which an appropriate accommodation
of the two rights can be reached in concrete cases.”229 This could also result in
opportunities for a broader reconsideration of the aims of copyright and the way
in which copyright achieves these aims—not simply the way in which copyright
impacts upon expression.
These are only a few of the consequences that could flow from Canadian
courts choosing to reconsider their approaches to the intersection of copyright
and the Charter right to freedom of expression. It is unclear, however, whether
227. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2005) at 74.
228. See, for instance, Graham Reynolds, “Towards a Right to Engage in the Fair Transformative
Use of Copyright-Protected Expression” in Michael Geist (ed), From Radical Extremism to
Balanced Copyright (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010). See also Fewer, supra note 6 at 199.
229. Eric Barendt, “Copyright and Free Speech Theory” in Jonathan Griffiths and Uma
Suthersanen (eds), Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses
(London: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 12.
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such reconsideration will take place. Lower courts have shown no sign that
they wish to revisit the issue. Similarly, the SCC has not signalled an interest in
explicitly engaging with this intersection.230
What is clear, however, is that the view that arguments challenging
the constitutionality of provisions of the Copyright Act on Charter right to
freedom of expression grounds are “bound to fail” is not correct;231 rather,
a Canadian court could determine that core provisions of Canada’s Copyright
Act unjustifiably infringe section 2(b) of the Charter. It is time for Canadian
courts to reinvigorate their consideration of this issue and explicitly reconsider
the constitutionality of copyright.

230. For a work that discusses the SCC’s approach to the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright, see Graham Reynolds, “The Limits of Statutory
Interpretation,” supra note 7.
231. Canwest 2008, supra note 3 at para 37.

